On the Acceleration of Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani Negotiations

The other noteworthy agreement referred to the reconstruction of the presently ruined medieval bridge of Ani across the bordering Akhurian River, through which Armenian and foreign tourists may enter the site of Ani. It is worth mentioning that while signing the Kars Treaty of 1921 the Armenian delegation asked the Turkish negotiators to consider their request of leaving Ani and Mount Ararat to Armenia, but as we know the Great National Assembly of Turkey had sharply rejected that plea. Presently, when Armenian alpinists desire to climb Mount Ararat, they enter Turkey from Georgia and ascend the mount by tested routes. Opening Ani for foreign tourists visiting Armenia is a new step presented to public opinion as boosting tourism.

In general, the atmosphere of these negotiations seems to show that each following step may be accompanied by more delays and difficulties because we are sure that the Turkish authorities would rather wait for the time when Armenia and Azerbaijan sign an agreement. We have already drawn the attention of our readers to the fact that the Armenian-Turkish negotiations held in 2008-2010 during the “Football Diplomacy” failed for the simple reason that Azerbaijan was resolutely against any normalization until there was a positive result in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. Currently while Armenia and Azerbaijan are still negotiating, Turkey is waiting for some tangible result and does not wish to cause anxiety to its “brother” and comrade-in-arms. Thus, it may be stated with certainty that the meetings and discussions of the Armenian and Turkish envoys would be long-lasting unless negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan achieve some progress.

The Process of Armenian-Azerbaijani Negotiations and Factors of Influence

The secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council recently informed that the preparation of the peace treaty draft between the two countries is in progress. Armenia has received the latest text of the Azerbaijani proposals and is working on it in order to send it back to the Azerbaijani side in due time. Generally, the situation during the weeks after the September armed confrontation when Armenia lost over two hundred servicemen at its frontiers is still very tense. Many Armenian experts consider that new armed conflicts are highly plausible. Most probably the keen interest and recommenced efforts of the international community to revive the negotiation processes are aimed at preventing the resumption of new conflicts.

It was considered in Armenia that it might rely on the support of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as the Azerbaijanis intruded onto sovereign Armenian territory. It turned out that at least three of the six members of that organization were much closer to Azerbaijan than to Armenia, a member of this organization, while Russia, being the strategic ally of both states, could not or would not aggravate its relations with either of them. Under these conditions, with no support expected from the CSTO, Armenia turned to the West. France promised to send a civilian observation mission consisting of 300 gendarmes, and other EU members promised to send 100 civil observers to Armenia.

In his turn, the prime minister of Armenia declared that Armenia would not provide its territory to CSTO for regular drills planned for 2023, so the CSTO resolved to conduct its military drills in Kirgizstan. In this situation, the CSTO tried to correct its mistakes by declaring its readiness to send observers to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The presence of the Western observers on Armenia’s borders has caused great anxiety in Azerbaijan, whose politics and strategy was based on representing Armenia in Russia as a pro-Western state, and as an incorrigibly pro-Russian state in the West. The question that now became the most troubling for Yerevan analysts was what final decision the Armenian authorities might make between the Russian and European observers to be placed along the Armenian borderline. The further development of allied relations with Russia or the newly warming and deepening ties with the EU and US would depend on it. As making various assumptions and discussing different scenarios of development seems quite untimely, we’d rather wait and see in order to receive exact answers to these questions.