‘America First’: Armenia’s Reckless Gamble

As I analyzed in my August article, the Washington Agreement of August 8, 2025, was ambiguous on many points but revealing on others. Following US diplomatic exchanges in Azerbaijan and Armenia, a new bilateral Armenian-US text was signed and released on January 14, 2026: the TRIPP Implementation Framework Agreement. It improves significantly on the first text with some useful clarifications; however, pitfalls appear in the details.

The official text states in very diplomatic language that: “Decisions affecting certain sensitive issues and which have been the subject of reservations should be jointly resolved by a US-Armenia steering committee.” What are these sensitive issues and reservations to which reference is made? It is also recognized that the success of the Agreement depends on five factors. They reveal as many challenges or questions:

• Continued institutionalization of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This means that the agreement can only be fully realized if the peace treaty is definitively signed and ratified by both parties. However, the current conditions are not yet met, particularly the amendment of the Armenian Constitution and the clarification of a route allowing for “unhindered circulation” and “without contact with Armenians.”
• Progress toward the full normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. This factor adds an additional challenge and delay, as Turkey has consistently stated that it will only normalize relations once Armenia-Azerbaijan relations are pacified.
• Sustained commitment from the United States. This element is more enigmatic, even worrisome. Does it imply that continued US support is not guaranteed?
• Regional cooperation and stability. This factor is difficult to interpret, especially considering that regional stability must include the situation concerning Iran, but also Georgia, and the ongoing negotiations around the complex Kurdish question.
• Effective strengthening of the capacities of Armenian institutions. Which institutions are being referred to? Democratic institutions, national security, or economic operators?

The January 14 agreement cites the objectives and benefits for both Armenia and the United States.

The advantages expected by the United States are clear and consistent with its foreign policy objectives: the opening of new markets for American investments, businesses, and goods; improved trade connectivity in the region, facilitating the transport of raw materials, critical minerals, and rare earth elements to American markets; and the diversification of trade routes between the United States, Europe, and Asia, thus ensuring the free movement of people and goods despite geopolitical fluctuations.

This last point deserves closer attention because it suggests that traffic on this multimodal road would be guaranteed regardless of geopolitical events. This means that the world could collapse around the road and states could fight with each other, but the road would still exist and operate. This is eerily similar to the Syrian experience I described in my aforementioned article, where American protection of Syrian oil wells remained unmoved by all the events that have occurred in Syria since 2011. This interpretation is all the more worrying given that the January 14 Agreement still makes no mention of responses to Armenia’s national security concerns.

The benefits mentioned for Armenia are: opportunities in terms of employment, joint ventures, technology transfer, and training. The effect of the announcements parallel to this Agreement regarding development and cooperation in the field of Artificial Intelligence should not be alluded. There is no differential advantage for Armenia. Azerbaijan has signed the same type of agreement in this area.

Thus very weak returns for a surrender of control over the strip of land conceded by Armenia. Armenian leaders maintain that sovereignty and territorial integrity are guaranteed under this Agreement. On these points, the text clearly mentions that national law will apply over the entire area including in the land strip of the Trump Route and that the borders will not be affected. However, the status of the development company TRIPP is more ambiguous.

Legally, the company responsible for developing TRIPP is granted the right to exploit the strip of land for an initial period of 49 years. The United States holds a 74% stake and Armenia 26%. A second phase of an additional 50 years is planned, with Armenian participation potentially increasing to 49%, thus still remaining a minority stake.

Any change in the shareholders of the “TRIPP development Company” (including sale, gift of shares, merger, spin-off, reorganization, or any other legal or de facto act) and in the ultimate beneficial owners must be subject to the prior agreement of the governments of the United States and Armenia. This provision raises questions, and many commentators in Armenia have raised them. Who might be these “ultimate beneficial owners”? Who would have the last word if the United States and Armenia have opposing views on the choice of these beneficiaries? If we observe the Trump method in his management of transactions, it is very likely that the balance of power on the diplomatic level associated with a minority position in the capital of the Consortium will be unfavorable to Armenia.

Furthermore, what will happen to granting passage to the roads, railways, and gas pipelines linking Iran to Armenia? It is clear that as long as Iran is not subservient to the United States, this passage will be closed by the US.

Armenia was recently scolded by President Trump who asked them to provide justifications for the continuation of Armenian trade with Iran, a country under US sanctions, de facto extraterritorial.

In conclusion, Armenia submits to the American diktat, loses control of part of its strategic territory and (temporarily?) breaks its centuries-old friendship with Iran. The “America First” policy and Israel’s influence prevail without surprise.

III – Aliyev, the Master of the Game

Azerbaijan, which was consulted before this January 14, 2026 Agreement, has acknowledged it, but its president is expressing nuanced views on the finalization of the peace treaty and, above all, asserting his control over the success of this project. Until August 2025, Azerbaijan’s policy was based on neutrality towards the blocs and a strategy aimed at strengthening its role as a gateway between Asia and Europe. Since then, it has conspicuously distanced itself from Moscow and continues to act as an ally of Israel.

During the Washington Agreements on August 8, 2025, Trump endorsed President Aliyev, calling him a strongman who had successfully resolved his country’s problems — namely, reconquering Nagorno-Karabakh by force and in violation of international law.

Cynically, in Davos, President Aliyev presented himself as the architect of peace between Armenia and his country. He even steals the spotlight from the Armenian Prime Minister’s cherished “crossroads of peace” project: Aliyev declares that “Azerbaijan is the only reliable, safe, and welcoming destination country allowing Europe to establish a link with Central Asia.” Aliyev even claims credit for the TRIPP project: “We will create a new transport corridor linking Asia to the Caspian Sea, passing through Azerbaijan, Armenia, Nakhichevan (which is part of Azerbaijan), Turkey, and Georgia, in addition to the existing corridors.” This statement indicates that he is the true mastermind behind the TRIPP project. Its success depends on his goodwill. A corridor already exists that bypasses Armenia to the north: the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil pipeline, which satisfies the British (BP being the architect and main user), Georgia (which views the Trump route with suspicion because it is excluded from it), and Turkey. Another bypass route is already under construction along the Iranian side of the border to connect Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Its completion and operation will depend on the course of geopolitical events in Iran.

Finally, the difference in the treatment of the two Caucasian countries by the US administration is beyond a shadow of a doubt, given the respect that President Aliyev inspires in President Trump but also in consideration of Azerbaijan’s financial and therefore commercial capabilities. Which makes Aliyev say that “We are entering a new phase of cooperation with the United States, whether in terms of politics, economy, energy or even defense.” This indicates that Azerbaijan will be able to buy a new generation US military equipment, further strengthening the imbalance with Armenia.

Conclusion

Aliyev has shown himself to be the key player in the Caucasus. This new route would be useful but is not essential. Furthermore, we must not forget Georgia, although the pro-Russian Georgian government faces domestic turmoil whose management has been sanctioned by the United States and Europe. Meanwhile, Georgia maintains good relations with Azerbaijan. The Trump route is detrimental to Georgia’s interests.

The regional issues are inextricable as long as these extra-regional geopolitical maneuvers continue. Azerbaijan holds many advantages. Time is on its side, and the next condition for signing the peace treaty is already in the works: the Western Azerbaijan Organization is preparing for the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia. A major international conference convened on December 4, 2025, gathering 100 lawyers from 60 countries; Aliyev was the guest speaker. The Armenian Foreign Intelligence Service has just published a report that considers this project a threat to the country’s security. The opening of borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan and the return of Azerbaijanis will inevitably lead to the economic and demographic takeover of the country and to the emigration of Armenian citizens.

According to STRATFOR, Armenia and Azerbaijan will take modest steps this year to implement the agreements reached last year with a view to establishing peace and thus reducing the risk of another war. The two countries will likely continue their trade relations cautiously and strive to build trust, but through moderate trade cooperation rather than comprehensive economic integration.

As far as Armenia is concerned, no strategy worthy of this word is perceived. One cannot even speak of strategic ambiguity. It will always be possible to cancel some of the agreements, but as time goes on, the chances of backsliding peacefully and in a multilateral diplomatic framework diminish or disappear. Critics would argue: does Armenia have a choice? Yes, it always does. In any case, it was necessary to adopt the behavior and attitude of a vassal state. Aligning with the leader of the “America First” policy is more like a gamble rather than a well-thought strategy. President Trump has already chosen his long-term partners. It is doubtful that Armenia is one of them. Moreover, Armenia has already conceded the control of the Corridor. They may object to it being called the “Zangezur Corridor,” but it would that in all but name.

(Philippe Raffi Kalfayan, based in Paris, is a lawyer, lecturer in international law and a former secretary general of FIDH (International Federation of Human Rights), who has earned a Ph.D. in international law. He is a regular columnist for the Armenian Mirror-Spectator.)