The Russian 102nd Military Base in Armenia was one of the few topics that was not discussed in Armenia’s domestic political discourse. Discussions about it were minimal, unlike other controversial issues on the Armenia–Russia agenda, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), gas prices, certain restrictions imposed on Armenia, and so on. It also was not a contentious issue on the bilateral Russian-Armenian agenda around which intense political debates could develop. Yet this topic was brought onto the agenda following the meeting between the Russian president and the Armenian prime minister, when Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the military base could be withdrawn from Armenian territory at an accelerated pace if Armenia did not need it.
This then became a serious and heated topic of discussion in Armenian political and political-science circles. It was the Russian side that brought the issue onto the agenda and directed the responsibility for the decision toward Yerevan with the formulation, “if Yerevan does not need it.” In other words, Russia appeared to be waiting for Armenia to declare that it wanted the military base withdrawn.
Armenia’s response surprised many, particularly pro-Western forces, because Armenia countered that if Russia wanted to withdraw the military base, Armenia would not object. This was stated at the level of the prime minister, and, in essence, the responsibility for making the decision was shifted back to the Russian side, so that Russia would make the decision. Thus, it appears that the two sides shifted responsibility for the decision onto each other, while at the same time bringing the issue of the military base’s withdrawal into the public debate and onto the political agenda.
The Russian military base in Armenia was established with several objectives, the first of which was to maintain a Russian military presence in the South Caucasus. This became particularly important after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Russia’s departure from the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. The base remained Russia’s only foothold in the South Caucasus. In addition, it was a military base located directly opposite the border with NATO member Turkey, which had strategic significance from the perspective of NATO–Russia confrontation. It was also one of the components of Russia’s status as a great power, because having a military base in another country’s territory underscored Russia’s role as a global player.
The presence of the military base played an important role in maintaining the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Its presence was not in Turkey’s interests, since the base of a rival state was located directly on its border. On the other hand, it was not making Iran nervous, at least from the perspective that there could not be another type of military presence in Armenia apart from the Russian one. This made Armenia and the region more predictable and controllable for Tehran, even if the military presence belonged not to Iran itself but to a country with more or less friendly relations. It was also an indicator of the strategic and military-diplomatic partnership between Russia and Armenia, something that was proudly emphasized in both countries.
The base played a certain role in ensuring regional stability, considering the security architecture that existed before the 2020 war while Russia and Armenia were strategic allies. Formally, its existence also pursued the goal of protecting Armenia and was presented as a deterrence mechanism, if not for Nagorno-Karabakh, then for Armenia’s security.
