Donald Trump’s recent statement that he applied pressure in order to advance Armenian-Azerbaijani peace went largely unnoticed, despite its exceptional importance. It cannot be ruled out that the statement went largely unnoticed because that what the authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan wanted. In Armenia, elections are expected soon, and the authorities are trying to show that they are the ones bringing about peace. In Azerbaijan, it is natural that Aliyev positions himself as a regional player on whom pressure is extremely difficult to exert, even for the president of a great power.
In fact, pressure was directed exclusively at Azerbaijan, since Armenia was already under pressure and prepared to make additional concessions. In other words, it was not Armenia that brought about a change in Baku’s position through negotiations; rather, that change occurred as a result of pressure from Washington — not out of consideration for Armenia’s interests or out of any goodwill, but strictly within the logic of US interests.
There is a high probability that Azerbaijan did not want to initial the peace agreement because, under that framework, it would have had to take into account the presence of Trump’s signature under the document as well. In other words, if Azerbaijan intended to seize additional territories from Armenia or exert pressure on Armenia before the signing of the agreement — particularly in terms of demarcation and delimitation — after initialing the document, Baku’s hands would have been somewhat tied.
Baku has, by and large, already obtained everything it wanted from Armenia, yet it continues to maintain its maximalist rhetoric. However, it should not be ruled out that, if the opportunity arises, Baku may still extract additional concessions from Armenia.
The fact that Trump’s adviser, Steven Witkoff, did not visit Armenia in March and instead traveled only to Baku for negotiations once again demonstrates that Armenia assumed a passive role in the process and that there was simply nothing to discuss with Yerevan. It is evident that Armenia has met and continues to meet a broad range of concessions. If the situation changed to some extent between the beginning and the end of 2025, this has no connection whatsoever to the actions of Armenia’s authorities.
This is a purely geopolitical process, driven by Trump within the framework of advancing US interests from Central Asia to the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe. A certain stabilization of the situation by no means implies that Azerbaijan has ceased to view Armenia as a hostile state. Evidence of this is abundant, ranging from official rhetoric to concrete actions. Therefore, the decisive role in these developments has been played by US policy under Trump’s leadership, while Armenia’s authorities have had virtually no involvement in this process — nor could they have.
