Although nearly 3 weeks have passed since the beginning of the war against Iran, and the United States has managed to kill Iran’s Supreme Leader and several high-ranking military officials, destroy parts of the navy, and strike key infrastructure, the war is far from over. Initially, the plan was to carry out rapid and targeted military strikes against Iran based on the assumption that the Iranian system of the government would not be able to resist effectively. The expectation was that the population would not rally around the leadership, that uncontrollable public uprisings would occur, and that a decapitated leadership would be unable to function.
However, these expectations have not materialized so far. On the contrary, Iran’s power centers appear consolidated, and the system shows no visible signs of internal fracture yet. It is important to understand what Washington’s miscalculations were and how the US currently assesses the situation. One thing is certain: at this point, Iran has managed to disrupt the US–Israeli plan for a quick victory.
Expectations in Washington that a broad coalition would support the United States and Israel against Iran have also failed to materialize. Prior to “Operation Epic Fury,” many within the Trump inner circle believed that various states and regional actors would join the confrontation once the operation began. Despite those expectations, no direct involvement occurred from Iraqi Kurdish units, NATO members, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, or other actors historically at odds with Iran.
The issue is not that these states have resolved their disputes with Tehran. Rather, they understand that airstrikes alone cannot achieve government change. Such a goal would require a ground operation — likely even more complex than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — and neither the United States nor Israel appears prepared for such an undertaking.
At the same time, predictions that the Iranian opposition would seize the moment and launch a large-scale uprising have also proven unrealistic. Although Iran experienced protests months earlier, mass demonstrations have largely disappeared since the start of the war, likely due to wartime conditions and fear of harsher punishments under emergency rule. There is also a fundamental difference between opposing one’s government and confronting a foreign military attack while outsiders encourage government change.
Regional actors are also acting cautiously. Kurdish forces remember their experience in Syria, where heavy losses produced little strategic gain. Meanwhile, pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and Iranian strikes in northern Iraq have suppressed Kurdish militant activity.
