Assessing the Significance of the August 8 Armenia-Azerbaijan Documents

One way to assess the totality of the documents is to see to what extent their contents address the most critical challenges Armenia is facing.

10. I think it can be argued that these documents strengthen the preservation of Armenia’s sovereignty and the securing of its territorial integrity. Azerbaijan has reinforced its commitment to respecting Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Azerbaijan is now committed to the principle of Armenia’s territorial integrity on the basis of the 1991 Almaty declaration, a goal pursued by Yerevan for some time but resisted by Baku.

11. The documents also further remove the threat of an Azerbaijani military action against the south of Armenia for the purpose of securing a transit route through Meghri between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan exclave. That threat had been hanging over Armenia for some time, causing anxiety and uncertainty among the population and, possibly, some potential investors. Under the circumstances, Baku’s agreement to reiterate the principle of the non-use of force to settle remaining differences with Armenia, under the circumstances, should not be dismissed reflexively.

12. In assessing the value of these agreements, one has to think about the options Armenia has; not many. Even when Armenia was victorious in the first Karabakh war, the choice was not between good and bad, but between bad and the worse.

13. The people of Armenia and others who care about them have good reason to breathe somewhat easier as these documents move further and minimize a major threat to their security. They also have the right to have a more promising future, with less uncertainty in general and less anxiety about the fate of their sons. Hope for a peaceful future is a necessary condition for the productive and positive relationship between society and the state, for democracy and social harmony.

14. The signing of these documents also constitutes a test for the opposition in Armenia. Most of that opposition has been arguing that Armenia is on the path to another war and self-destruction, and that the policies of the Pashinyan government are inevitably leading to those consequences. Their usual mode of operation is to find ways of interpreting policies and policy steps in a way that justify their unmitigated and absolute opposition to the Pashinyan government, for some good but mostly wrong reasons. That may be normal under normal circumstances, which is not the case for Armenia. It remains to be seen whether these forces can bring themselves to appreciate the positive direction in which Armenia-Azerbaijan relations are moving, instead of remaining focused on the single-minded goal of removing Pashinyan from power.

It is not possible to express concern for Armenia’s territorial integrity and security and not appreciate the positive aspects of the initialing of the peace agreement and the further commitment of Azerbaijan to the non-use of force to settle remaining differences with Armenia.

No document or set of documents offer an ironclad guarantee for security and peace. It is also not possible to argue that these documents offer such a guarantee. But those who cannot appreciate positive steps in that direction are certain to contribute to living through self-fulfilling prophecies.

15. Undoubtedly, this arrangement increases the strategic significance of Armenia, which has been left out of South Caucasus transit routes of international significance.

• III. Four Key Issues

Regarding the two issues which Baku has raised as obstacles to the signing of the peace agreement, as opposed to the initialing that took place in Washington, and more:

16. First, the difficult issue of a transit route for Azerbaijani citizens and goods from Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through Meghri: a new formula has been accepted, that of a lease to a US entity that would function under sovereign Armenian territorial rights and control. I will address the implications of this arrangement for the strategic interest of regional and other powers later.

The main point here is that the arrangement lacks any specifics; it is difficult to know at this point how the general principles will be translated into practice. That will depend on the legislation that the Armenian National Assembly will need to pass on the subject; and the negotiations that must now begin between Armenia and the US, with definite input from Azerbaijan, possibly Turkey and the actions or lack thereof of Russia and Iran.

It is significant, as Gaïdz Minassian has suggested, that the text no longer refer to the southern transportation issue as a “corridor,” which has raised unnecessary fears and concerns.

17. The second issue is the persistent demand by Azerbaijan that Armenia change its Constitution to exclude any element that can be — and that has been interpreted by Baku — as territorial demands by Armenia from Azerbaijan.

In this case. we know that none of the documents adopted on August 8 refer to this issue. Yet, on August 8 President Aliyev and one of his advisors, Elchin Amirbayov, reiterated Baku’s demand for such a change as a precondition for signing the peace agreement and subsequent normalization of relations with Armenia.

It is not clear to me to what extent this issue, not a simple one for Armenia to accomplish, is a real concern for Baku and to what extent it is a means to delay the signing, preserving Baku’s options in the future. Baku wants to eliminate any constitutional basis for any future Armenian leader to advocate or implement a policy of territorial demands from Azerbaijan. It is possible that Baku’s concern is genuine. But that does not make it a real issue. After all, had Pashinyan been able to change the Armenian Constitution as easily as Aliyev can Azerbaijan’s, in the future a new leader in Armenia who disagrees with Pashinyan’s policies can change that new Constitution too.

What will consolidate peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the building of more trust between them, the development of normal relations that will benefit the peoples of both countries, and the end of aggressive Azerbaijani rhetoric and actions against Armenia, that fuel the Armenian opposition’s arguments that Azerbaijan does not want peace, that it is not trustworthy, that when Armenia accedes to Baku’s terms, Baku comes up with new demands.

It is not possible to have real concerns about future leaders of Armenia who may achieve power using Azerbaijani behavior against Pashinyan, while at the same time feeding that opposition with such behavior.

18. There was agreement in Washington that Armenia and Azerbaijan will ask for the dissolution of OSCE’s Minsk Group, with support from the US. This provision was merely a legal one; the Minsk group had practically ceased to exist since the 2020 war, and had remained semi-comatose for a much longer period.

19. Although it appears that Azerbaijan is not yet fully committed to the tenets of the peace agreement, Baku will, hopefully, end the rhetoric on a Western Azerbaijan which, ostensibly, includes Armenia. This act may not be sufficient to allay fears in Armenia on the subject, but it would be a good place to start.

1. IV. International Dimensions

20. There is a tendency in the circle of analysts to measure the significance of these agreements in terms of their value for one side or the other of the geopolitical divide. The general perception is that the US or the West has won and Russia has lost. Furthermore, some argue that Russia will not take this loss sitting down; looking at Georgia and Ukraine, they argue that Armenia and Azerbaijan are risking quite a bit.

That is certainly a serious argument. But that argument presents two problems. First, it does not question Russia’s bullying beyond the interests Moscow has in neighboring lands, i.e., the cost to the peoples of the neighboring lands of adopting policies that are dominated by the threat of Russian retaliation.

Second, Russia’s behavior goes beyond protecting itself; it is also part of the imperial mindset that I have discussed elsewhere. Empires collapse; but the imperial mindset survives. How soon we forget that these same peoples sunk the Soviet/Russian empire.

Had the response of the Soviet/Russian empires and post-imperial mindsets to external threats been limited to the prescribed foreign and security policies of neighbors, it would have been understandable to expect that the neighbors act responsibly and not become tools in the hands of Russia’s antagonists or enemies. But just as history has shown that Russia can be counted on to retaliate with brute force against encroachments in what it considers its own backyard or underbelly, history also shows that Russia demands that the peoples of these lands be ruled by rulers of Moscow’s choice, in the model Moscow has created for itself, or with outright occupation and annexation of lands – as did the Soviet Union, while tsarist Russia occupied those lands outright. The taking for granted of an empire, under whatever name, has proven not to be a solution to the problem of strategic confrontations; rather, empires are more likely the cause of such confrontations.

I have serious doubts that the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children, the destruction of civilian targets and the targeting of civilians themselves, and the outright annexation of territories from neighbors can be explained by Russian concerns for a very seriously flawed Western policy of NATO expansion.

21. Empires collapse and retrench. Moscow is not currently in a position to occupy Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moscow has dominated the region by pitting one people against the other and by managing to bring elites that favor it to power, that is, by using a country’s domestic political antagonisms. This is not to delegitimize the grievances of domestic opposition forces; but rather to point out that it is often the case that legitimate grievances are coopted and then subsumed in the games of big players.

It is doubtful that there are many pro-Russian elements left in Azerbaijan. But they exist in Armenia and they are encouraged to resort to violence to change the government there. This where domestic and international politics overlap, this is how most of the opposition to the Pashinyan government — oligarchs, former rulers, the Church — could be understood.

Those who in their analysis ascribe a permanency to empires and take for granted the inevitability of post-imperial behavior ignore even the most recent history.

22. Russia took Armenia for granted and failed to fulfill the obligations it had assumed in bilateral and multilateral treaties that involved Armenia. Moscow has not offered any indication that it will behave differently in the future. Regardless, Moscow still expects to be treated as Armenia’s savior.

This is not to say that I agree with every aspect or articulation of the foreign and security policies of the government in Yerevan; but I do appreciate that the government’s main guiding principle has correctly been to seek the country’s security in the reduction of sources of conflict and threats to its territory by working with its neighbors while placing sovereignty, territorial integrity and peace above all other values.

23. Empires collapse and retrench – and not only the Russian one. The US empire too has been retrenching, despite the spasmodic, reflexive actions by Washington. The most important evidence for that should not be sought in American foreign policy; rather, it is in the quality, or lack thereof, of the leadership in Washington, the level of political discourse, and the unsustainable borrowing that is maintaining the state and its military expenditure. These are not instances that sustain an empire or post-imperial policy; rather, these are, historically, symptomatic of falling empires.

One can also look at the sorry state of the wider picture of the post-World World II world order that had been imagined and installed by the US: The UN and affiliated institutions, NATO, to name just a few. None of them are currently functioning with any level of effectiveness or harmony, mainly because of US policies.

24. The US appears as the guarantor of the August 8 agreements, but nothing in what was signed says so. Even if there were such a provision, it is difficult for me to imagine that the US will use force to compel either Armenia or Azerbaijan to abide by the agreements, should these signatories stumble on details when working on what was agreed on. If the US will not use its full resources to see through the peace process, any imagined guarantee remains symbolic, at best a matter of honor for the signatories and the ostensible guarantor.

Even under the best of circumstances, US guarantees remain fickle, more so considering the character and modus operandi of the current administration in Washington. The very personalized nature of US policymaking under the current administration tends to reinforce that sense of uncertainty and unpredictability that prevails in the US and, in fact, throughout the world. That sense is deepened when, in fact, the US has no vital interests in the South Caucasus; at best, US interests are peripheral to the region itself. They relate to Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Caspian Sea, etc.

Under the present circumstances, the US can trade Armenia for small change.

25. The US could have extracted significant concessions from Baku for admitting President Aliyev in the White House and gifting support for new investments in that country, either on Azerbaijan’s domestic front, or on issues involving Armenia: the constitutional change precondition, the Armenian prisoners in Baku.

But my sense is that the summit in Washington was not prepared meticulously by experts who were as familiar with the issues as they should have been. American diplomats who had a deep understanding of the issues had been let go from the State Department. It is possible that the current negotiators had done their homework and decided not to press the president of Azerbaijan, having another set of goals in mind. Still, it is difficult to avoid the sense that Washington may have looked at the summit as another chance for a naming opportunity.

26. Russia and Iran have expressed serious objections to the whole process, and understandably so. The government of Armenia is facing a challenge in managing their concerns. But we need to distinguish between any legitimate aspects of the concerns of these two important neighbors from their tendency to equate Armenia’s interests with theirs.

Sovereignty means making one’s own decisions on the basis of one’s interests.

Respect for Armenia’s sovereignty, which all countries, including Iran and Russia, have professed, means that Armenia must serve its own purposes and is not there to serve the interests of others. Taking into account the legitimate interests of neighbors does not mean to formulate and pursue policies that are based on the interests of others. Imaginative diplomacy can find solutions to any conflict between the interests of two countries, assuming the neighbors are willing to respect the solutions found by Armenia’s elected leaders and Armenia’s elected leaders are circumspect in their policies.

It is possible for any neighbor to use force to prevent Armenia from pursuing its interests as it defines it. And Armenia may not be in a position to resist. But then we have to accept that such is the threat we are facing. We have then to reduce our expectations from them as friendly countries or allies. Russia has proven to be unreliable, even as the only formal ally Armenia has.

Russia has proven to be unreliable also for Azerbaijan; in recent days it has destroyed SOCAR’s oil platforms and depots in the Odessa region.

Iran has dealt with Azerbaijan on the basis of its own interests regarding the Karabakh/Azerbaijan-Armenia issues. Most recently, Iran endorsed the ridiculously anti-Armenian Istanbul resolution of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Even in symbolic terms, high level Iranian officials have appeared in Shushi and Stepanakert, ignoring the sensibilities of the Armenian people. All of that is understandable; Iran is pursuing its state interests. Iran should show similar understanding when Armenia pursues its interests as it defines them. The internal debate in Iran is now pitting those who see the August 8 agreements as a threat and those who see these as offering new opportunities.

I have high respect for Russian diplomacy and I am cognizant of Russia’s long memory, patience and resilience. I also have the highest respect for the Iranian leadership’s deep sense of statehood that has endured millennia, and its proven ability to define its interests. One should not underestimate the ability of both countries to understand changes, to adjust themselves to new situations, and still protect their interests, working with Yerevan and Baku.

27. There is no question that, in essence, Europe and the US did not give up their anti-Soviet and anti-Russian mindsets increasing Moscow’s concerns about the threats to Russia to dangerous levels.

The question we should ask is, should we have concerns for the peoples of these neighboring countries?

Are they relevant? Do they matter? Or should they be seen strictly as the pawns in a chess game the big boys play? Do peoples matter in politics? If not, what is the purpose of politics, whether domestic or international? Is it only to satisfy the strategic interests of major powers —and whatever policies these powers devise in the name of vital interests and strategic concepts, in the name of their rivalries, abstracted from the realities in which the real peoples of these countries live?

28. Some may think this is the argument of an idealist. They would be mistaken. These are the questions of a historian who has lived through politics and, for a few critical years in the 1990s, was involved in diplomacy. If the local peoples and the peoples of the neighboring countries did not matter, empires that were started a few thousand years ago would have survived until our day.

The understanding of international rivalries and strategic models based on them, just imperial rivalries and strategies will remain deficient if they ignore the sometimes silent but always unavoidable role of peoples, whether subjects to imperial rule or populating the former colonies.

1. V. Concluding Remarks 

29. Azerbaijan and Armenia will need to work closely with Russia and Iran in order to help these two warring countries to consolidate the peace process underway between them.

30. Any and all of these issues require daily maintenance and care. The chances for further progress depend on the ability and willingness of the two republics to work together and to work directly and not return to the old habit of calling on uncles to support them or settle their disagreements.

31. Some solutions create more problems than they resolve. The arrangements reached on August 8 in Washington could end up being such a case. Fortunately, as indicated above, the foundational methodology of the agreements reached in Washington are the result of direct, unmediated, bilateral negotiations. And that is one of the most positive aspects of the agreements signed on August 8. There has been a significant increase in the trust the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia have in each other, a trust supported by an understanding that some of their interests, if not most, are shared. Not a solid trust yet, but enough to build on.

32. One way to assess the significance of these documents is to see if they mark sufficient progress for Turkey to now implement practical measures toward normalization of relations with Yerevan, including the opening of the border with Armenia. Do these documents offer President Ilham Aliyev sufficient reason to release Ankara from its hold on Turkey’s policy toward Armenia? So far there are not any signs that this will be the case. If such is the case, it is unfortunate, since with a few practical and meaningful steps Ankara could contribute significantly to the consolidation of the forward progress made with the adoption of these documents.

33. For a more permanent solution to the future of the South Caucasus one should look forward to making the South Caucasus a political concept, and not just a geographic one. The three republics of the South Caucasus could begin to cooperate on many levels to consolidate the gains achieved by the very serious progress made in recent negotiations. Such a development would be helpful to the goal of making the region more than just a playing field for external powers or having it treated as just a transit route by governments and experts whose analyses often ignore that there are real people living in the South Caucasus with their own ideas and interests.

It is now up to Armenia and Azerbaijan to work together, along with Georgia, not to allow their newfound path to peace to be coopted and/or be disrupted by any of the external forces. The alternative will be to return to an era of external manipulation and renewed conflict, when they are reduced to pawns in a game, and viewed strictly as countries through which pipelines flow. Azerbaijan and Armenia have proven themselves capable of developing such a path that strengthens their sovereignty; they can now sustain it. Sovereignty brings with it responsibilities; to start with, responsibilities toward the peoples for whom sovereignty is exerted.