A Question of Terminology and More: Corridors and Transit Routes

The wording of the “unobstructed movement” clause makes clear two basic characteristics regarding these transport connections:

1. The guarantor of the security for the connections is the Republic of Armenia; and that is so because the lands that will offer the connections are in Armenia, under Armenian sovereignty. Yet Russia will have some kind of oversight responsibility for these connections; and,
2. There will be some kind of a regime on these connections that will facilitate the transport.
3. The clause refers to more than one connection, although the disagreements are often presented as applying to one such connection or corridor.

The first observation in this respect is that the use of the term “corridor” for such transport connections is not appropriate; it is also harmful. Had the signatories of the Ceasefire Statement intended the connections to be “corridors,” they would have used that term in the Statement, which they have readily done to characterize the Armenia-Karabakh connection. Transport connections, as is used in the Statement, or transport routes are less ominous terms and facilitate discussion or negotiations on the subject.

Nonetheless, by using the term “corridor” the Nakhichevan connection(s), Baku, and often Ankara, are presuming and are aiming at creating an equivalence between the predicament of Nagorno Karabakh and that of Nakhichevan.

This is a false equivalence. Karabakh and Nakhichevan have different needs, exist in very different realities; and they do not face the same threats and dangers.

1. Nakhichevan does not have a history of being blockaded by Armenia as Nagorno Karabakh has been by Azerbaijan more than once. Karabakh was blockaded even before the start of the first war in 1991. At least during the first phases of the first war, when Armenia was trying to convince Baku to end its military aggression against Karabakh and it was still possible to do so, Armenia offered to keep its roads open between Western Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. It was Baku that refused to take that offer.
2. Armenia has never threatened to bomb or actually bombed the population or structures of Nakhichevan at any time, as opposed to Azerbaijan’s treatment of Nagorno Karabakh, when it used its air force and artillery to shell villages and towns in Karabakh. There were border skirmishes early in the conflict but the Nakhichevan border was quiet throughout the two wars.
3. Nakhichevan cannot be blockaded by Armenia as Karabakh was and as currently is by Azerbaijan. Nakhichevan has borders with Turkey and Iran which gives it access to two neighbors of Azerbaijan and offer options to avoid humanitarian crises, should there be any action by Armenia. These borders have been used for decades. In fact, both borders are extremely active, and last year Baku signed an agreement with Iran to develop existing routes that bypass Armenia. Karabakh is an enclave, surrounded by Azerbaijani lands; Karabakh has no such option but the Lachin corridor.
4. Finally, Nakhichevan has a legal status within Azerbaijan as an autonomous republic, a status that is enshrined in many treaties, including the 1921 Treaty of Kars. Azerbaijan is refusing to recognize even the Soviet era status of Nagorno Karabakh as an autonomous region.

Azerbaijan’s request for an expedited transport regime is understandable. That could be achieved through various mechanisms; Yerevan seems to have offered such a formula; there could be others. But it’s not reasonable for Azerbaijan to demand more, such as sovereignty over a corridor, when the problem can be resolved without demanding something Armenia or any other sovereign country cannot possibly cede. Especially since such a concession is justified neither by any need nor by the terminology used in the November 9, 2020, Statement.

We should also take note of the fact that the Lachin corridor, which Baku would like to see replicated for Nakhichevan, remains under Azerbaijani sovereignty, and the Russian presence is problematic in two ways: (a) Russian peacekeepers have no clear mandate, not even to remove demonstrators that are obstructing these forces from doing their job, securing a functioning transport connection between Karabakh and Armenia; and (b) According to the November 9 Statement, Baku can request that Russian forces leave the territory of Azerbaijan without offering any alternative transport security guarantees, except for Baku may offer.