Political Fallout after Sochi Meeting

“I beg to differ,” answered Pashinyan, and he brought up the issue of the POWs and the hostages still held in Azerbaijan. And also, the fact that Azerbaijani forces had violated Armenia’s territory repeatedly. All three leaders said they evaluated the meeting as positive and constructive. Pashinyan even stated that he found out that some problems, which had been deemed unsolvable, seemed to have solutions.

What was very unusual was Aliyev’s complete silence over the corridor issue, at least during the public session. That was intriguing, since he and his political master, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, until recently had constantly brought up the issue and even made threats to enforce the corridor.

At the end of the meeting, a benign statement was signed by the three parties, sparing domestic problems for each of them.

However, the opposition in Armenia is up in arms, insisting that Pashinyan had signed an agreement over the corridor and had sold out Karabakh. Demonstrators outside the parliament demanded that the government resign.

The trilateral statement which was released at the conclusion of the Sochi meeting stated that the parties had agreed to “take steps to increase the level of stability and the security on the Armenian-Azerbaijani order and to work towards the creation of a bilateral commission on the delimitation of the state border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia with its subsequent demarcation with the consultative assistance of the Russian Federation at the request of the parties.”

Of course, it is easier said than done, as the devil is in the details.

The opposing sides praised the role of the Russian peacekeepers profusely, while it is known that Baku has been actively trying to undermine their presence.

Of course, President Putin did not miss any opportunity to take credit for the peacekeeping force’s role as well as Russia’s role as mediator.

This particular issue has been promoted by many Kremlin advocates, comparing and contrasting the role of Turkey vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and that of Russia towards Armenia.

Now, however, we see a shift in the role of Russia toward Armenia. It has gone from an ally to a moderator — a game changer in Caucasian politics. Russia’s treaty agreements with Armenia seem obsolete now.

The political factors which have affected Aliyev’s mood, even to the point of conceding that there are positive signs from Armenia, are many. The first one is the Turkey factor. Ankara’s expansionism had stretched too far to be sustainable by its faltering economy. The tumbling Turkish lira and the opposition’s calls for a snap election almost shattered Erdogan’s dream for his 2023 reelection so he could be anointed as the second Ataturk.

That is why Erdogan tried hastily to mend faces with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel. As a reward for its good behavior, the UAE decided to invest $10 billion in Turkey to boost the latter’s economy.

Erdogan advised Aliyev to do the same with Iran, with which it had almost gone to war just recently, drawing red lines against border changes in the Caucasus.

Baku had already an unresolved issue with Iran over drilling rights in the Caspian Sea. Iran even almost went to war to stop Azerbaijan from encroaching on the territorial waters off its coasts. Overnight, Baku signed an agreement on the issue and that paid off handsomely as Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian congratulated Baku on the anniversary of November 9 for having reconquered its territory during the 44-day war. Iran was also invited to participate in projects in the “occupied territories,” which of course, will provide an opportunity to Tehran to keep an eye on Israeli activities in Azerbaijan.

In the meantime, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavusoglu had visited Tehran and lay the groundwork for the forthcoming visit of President Erdogan. But preempting that visit, Erdogan and Iran President Ebrahim Raisi met in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, and talked about future cooperation between their two countries. President Raisi even expressed his satisfaction over Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh.

All these developments demonstrated that at this moment, Ankara cannot afford to support Baku in a new war.

The other factor which has helped Aliyev to behave is perhaps that he had been assured by President Putin to formulate the corridor issue in a fashion that may not sound as if extra-territorial sovereign rights are being taken from Armenia but rather to have the corridor appear to be under the control of Russian forces, similar to the status of Lachin corridor.

The forthcoming meeting in Brussels will serve as a reactivation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, whose co-chairs are planning to visit the region.

Whether the group will visit Karabakh from Armenia or from Azerbaijan will serve as a symbolic political message.

The political process in the region is not always moving in the direction that Aliyev had anticipated. Therefore, this will give Armenia a chance to build its armed forces in order to be able to maintain the credibility of its diplomacy.