The June 2025 12-day Iran–Israel War and US military strikes targeting Iranian nuclear sites created shock waves in the Middle East and beyond. Iran and Israel exchanged strikes twice in 2024, but these were limited and mostly symbolic operations.
While the war did not solve critical issues between Iran and Israel, and there is a possibility of another escalation, it demonstrated the volatile nature of Middle Eastern geopolitics, shaped by evolving balance of power.
Armenia is a neighbor of Iran, and this fact alone is enough to mean that Armenia will be affected by any Iran–Israel confrontation. However, there are other factors that can amplify the implications for Armenia of a potential long-term war against Iran.
First, the Israeli attack against Iran was another step in “legitimizing” the use of force to solve interstate tensions. This is bad news for Armenia, since it serves to validate the narrative of the president of Azerbaijan, who in recent years has reiterated many times that international law is in decline and the world is entering an era of “might is right.” Given Azerbaijan’s assertive and aggressive policy toward Armenia, and its consistent promotion of extraterritorial concepts such as the “Zangezur corridor” and “Western Azerbaijan,” the further legitimization of use of force against sovereign countries makes it easier for Azerbaijan to have a new attack on Armenia somehow accepted by external powers.
Second, in recent years Syunik has become a focus in geoeconomic and geopolitical tensions, as Azerbaijan demands from Armenia the establishment of the extraterritorial “Zangezur corridor” to reach the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic and Turkey. It will connect Turkey with Central Asia, boosting the Pan-Turkism ideas. Iran is opposing this scenario, viewing it as a direct threat to its vital national interests. Given Tehran’s military capacities and capabilities, Iran is probably the only tangible external hard-power factor deterring Azerbaijan from using force to open the “corridor.” Any significant decline in Iran’s capacities and capabilities might encourage Azerbaijan to use the window of opportunity and launch a military attack.
Third, Armenia has only two open borders, with Georgia and Iran, and up to 30% of Armenian foreign trade passes via Iran according to the Statistical Committee of Armenia. Any significant disruption of this transit can have drastic negative implications for the Armenian economy, and during the 12-day war Armenia was already beginning to face problems in maintaining import/export operations via Iran.
