APRI Provides Insights into Armenia’s Foreign Policy Challenges

At best, he said, perhaps there could be a greater US presence, with more American trainers in Armenia and a “tough approach,” telling Turkey that the US has serious interests in the region and, though making concessions where Turkey wants them, insisting that the US also wants to see results.

He responded similarly to an audience question about why the US does not pressure Israel more to stop giving Azerbaijan weapons. Herbst said that with the current Middle East situation, this would be considered a tertiary priority, but he did feel that the US should give Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a freer hand in the politics of the current wars, and if it did, it could be easier to ask Israel to shut off the weapons spigot to Azerbaijan, and maybe even to Turkey as well.

In response to a second audience question about what Armenia could do to get more US support, Herbst replied that he would give the Pashinyan government and its “excellent ambassador in Washington” (Lilit Makunts) high marks for reaching out to the US but concluded, “I am not sure that Armenia can do much more.” It was up to the US and the West to do more, if it had the will to become more assertive, he admitted. If the US could get the Israelis on board, the US could then go to the Turks to have a conversation, he said, and the US could also do a bit more with Azerbaijan.

As to why the US does not do more to stop Russian oil and gas being sold through Azerbaijan, Herbst replied that Azerbaijan was not the worst scofflaw here. He noted that both Armenia and Georgia, as well as Kirgizstan has done a lot of this (though Mirror-Spectator readers will note that the scale of Azerbaijan’s actions are much greater than those of Armenia).

Finally, Herbst noted that if the ruling Georgian Dream won the (then upcoming) October 26 parliamentary elections in a free and fair way, the US would have no qualms to continue its relationship but if it stole the election, relations with the US would grow frostier. He observed that the Georgian Dream has been cozying up to the Russians and if relations worsen between Georgia and the US, Russia will take advantage of this and this will make Armenia and Pashinyan’s position more difficult.

(As it happens, the Georgian Dream did win the elections but the opposition, including the Georgian president, claimed that they were illegitimate and falsified, while officials in Washington and Brussels called for an investigation.)

Armenian Foreign Policy Pivots
The second APRI presentation was that of a four-person panel moderated by APRI’s Vice President of Strategy and Development Anahide Pilibossian. Pilibossian introduced the focus of the panel, on whether Armenia is pivoting away from Russia towards the West, or to Asia, or even more broadly, “to the world.” The panelists were Dhruva Jaishankar of the Observer Research Foundation America, Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute, Garo Paylan of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute (and a frequent opinion writer for the Mirror-Spectator).

Jaishankar started off the discussion offering three observations. First, there is a new type of Cold War, with conflicts connected in complicated ways. Some examples he gave are the French accusing Azerbaijan of fomenting separatism in New Caledonia, Ukrainian intelligence helping Malian rebels fighting Russian mercenaries in the Sahara, and North Korean soldiers fighting in the Ukraine.

Secondly, he pointed out that the distribution of power globally is changing rapidly. Whereas 25 or 30 years ago the US and its allies constituted 85 percent of the global economy, today they are only 50 percent, and this is declining yearly. Not only China but other countries are growing stronger. Consequently the idea that the US could solve the world’s problems is increasingly questioned.

Third, these changes play out in many realms besides conventional defense or nuclear power. Technologically, Jaishankar said, we see hacking into the infrastructure systems of other countries. In terms of connectivity, the maps of the supply chains and trade of certain nations are being redrawn. He concluded that today almost anything that can be weaponized may very well be.

Lieven felt it was a time of great uncertainty, with the US and Georgian elections, the undecided Ukraine war, and a probable second Israeli attack on Iran, which could have very serious consequences for Armenia. It would therefore make sense for Armenia to pursue a very cautious and prudent policy and attempt diversification or multivector foreign policy.
Paylan chimed in that small nations are vulnerable. No big power intervened during the nine-month blockade of 120,000 Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh), which ended badly, indicating that this is a dark era where only might and leverage, neither of which Armenia possesses, will prevail. Of three regional powers, Russia, Iran and Turkey, only Iran is “friends” with Armenia and opposed the Russian agenda. Paylan suggested, “we need to pivot to strategic thinking, which requires getting as many [regional] powers in the region on board — which can be Turkey.”

Paylan later in the panel elaborated that Armenia did not want to engage with Turkey from 1995 to 2015, when the latter was closer to the West, because it did not recognize the Armenian Genocide. Paylan at the time suggested that engagement could change Turkish perceptions of Armenians. Turkey instead pivoted to Moscow and Baku, coming under the influence of Ilham Aliyev. Paylan said he warned the Armenian government about this, but it feared being called traitorous if it tried to get closer to Turkey. “We needed to choose the best of the worst scenarios,” Paylan said, but “We didn’t have the necessary flexibility.”

Paylan said that after the 2020 war, when the Turkish economic was in a terrible situation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan saw relations with Armenia as a bargaining chip with the West, and at least four times sent messages to the West that he was ready to open the border. However, the West did not respond because it saw Erdogan as a supporter of Hamas, and in addition, Paylan said, Armenian organizations tried to push the West to sanction Turkey.

Paylan concluded that engagement with Turkey could be beneficial for Armenia and strategic thinking was necessary. He said Turkey could paradoxically become a lifeline for Armenia, especially as Armenia will be vulnerable when an Israel-Iran war breaks out.

Rubin said he did not disagree with the prior speakers, but reframed their approach, stating: “We can talk about shifting power dynamics but it’s important to recognize that there’s another issue at stake. This is what I see behind the erosion, perhaps, of Russian influence, at some point of American influence as well, and the influence of others, and that is trust. We are in a situation right now where there’s … a lack of shamelessness attached to the violation of trust.” He gave many examples of the US making statements which turned out to be outright lies and violations of trust. For the Armenians, the declaration of Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Yuri Kim that the US would not allow any effort at ethnic cleansing in Karabakh is one.

Consequently, Armenia should be less trusting in international relations he said, adding in an elliptical allusion to the Pashinyan government: “Now, not everything is done to Armenians. Armenians have agency. And one of the problems in Armenia itself is one can be very, very adept at domestic politics and be woefully naïve when it comes to international relations. And the danger is, when one assumes that they are brilliant in every aspect of governance.”

As far as the border goes with Turkey, Rubin said that similarly, agreements that had been made in the past must be accepted and enforced. The Treaties of Moscow and Kars call for open borders between Turkey and Armenia, so it is not for Turkey to add new demands and its blockade is illegal.

Pilibossian asked Lieven about Russia, and he replied that with the Ukraine war, Russia’s agenda in the Caucasus is obviously limited, though Russia still has troops in Armenia. He said Russia is trying to hang on to as much influence as it can but also looking to prevent new crises. Russia he said seems not to oppose an East-West route from Turkey to Azerbaijan as long as it controls it, and Turkey has become a very important trade partner for Russia, meaning it will have to consider everything in the future in terms of its relationship with Ankara. Lieven said this certainly qualifies any commitments Russia has to Armenia.

Lieven, in response to an audience question as to whether it would be wise for Armenia to demand all Russian troops leave its territory to allow full Western military support, responded: “That would indeed make excellent sense if you thought you were going to get Western military support, but I know of no plans or even possibilities of either European countries or the United States deploying troops in Armenia, and if of course the United States did deploy troops in Armenia, there would be a very good chance that they would be used against Iran. I can imagine few scenarios more disastrous for Armenia than that, especially because even if they did come, they might go home again. Armenia can’t go home. Armenia lives there.”

Moderator Pilibossian added that Europeans observe that if they do not send troops to Ukraine, why should Armenians expect more than this from the West.

Rubin agreed with Lieven’s assessment of the West, declaring: “…if the United States isn’t fully committed and if we can’t keep our word beyond four years, it would be a grievous mistake which would risk essentially Armenia sticking out its head only to get chopped off.” On the other hand, he thought Armenia could possibly have both Russian and US military presence, as in Syria, and play one power against the other to a point.

Paylan said Armenia shouldn’t be the subject of great power rivalry and it also should not depend on any outside power. He said, “We should only depend on our minds…We need to build leverage. We need to mitigate the risks and maximize the opportunities.”

When asked by Pilibossian about how India’s multivector relations with Iran, the US and Russia could promote stability in the Caucasus region, Jaishankar pointed out that it is already helping diversify Armenia’s relationships in four dimensions, in part out of concern for the convergence between Pakistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Two of these dimensions are already concretely expanding: India is providing weapon systems to Armenia and educational and training programs connect the citizens of both countries. Two aspects are aspirational, with much work to be done: trade is meager and India or Indian companies are not yet actively involved in infrastructure initiatives including Armenia, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Western sanctions against Iran and the current Middle East fighting complicate the latter.

The panelists were each asked to give final words of advice for Armenia. Paylan again proposed strategic thinking, Rubin bluntly said to trust no one, Lieven suggested a policy of prudence, caution and diversification, and Jaishankar, agreeing with the others, advised diversification in foreign relations.

Armenia’s Security in Quest for Regional Peace
A second panel, moderated again by Lara Setrakian, included as participants Colonel (Retired) Robert E. Hamilton of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nerses Kopalyan of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Leonid Nersisyan of APRI Armenia, and Margarita Tadevosyan of George Mason University, and examined issues of Armenian security.
Kopalyan said that Armenia is diversifying at the hard power level, obtaining weapons from various nations while conducting military reforms. It is building a new security structure, emphasizing resiliency at the level of national security strategy, and enhancing its diplomatic capabilities now that it is no longer viewed as a Russian satellite. It has the political will now to do this as well as the necessity, along with outside investment from the West.

When asked how a vulnerable Armenia could antagonize Russia, Kopalyan replied that there was a misconception here: any challenge to what he termed a “master-slave” relationship was seen by Russia as anti-Russian. Armenia does not want to sever all ties with Russia but wants to exercise its sovereignty and autonomy.

Nersisyan, a Russian Armenian, said that dependency on Russia in the security domain was difficult to overcome. Even language skills align Armenia with Russia. However, after 2021, new defense procurement elsewhere is filling in the gap created by the lack of Russian support.

Nersisyan optimistically said that based on some international economic forecasts, in five years Armenia will have the same defense spending as Azerbaijan does today, since the Armenian budget grew 20 percent this year and the Azerbaijani budget decreased 6 percent. Armenia is two times lower than Azerbaijan in military acquisitions or expenditures, which last was true in 2003 or 2004. He said this means that the gap between the two countries is much smaller now and it is possible to prepare various types of deterrence, not only diplomatic, without matching an attacker’s resources.

Nersisyan added Armenia was not ready for an all-in war without major support from outside, but could handle low-intensity warfare in 2025. While he said there is not going to be any country which is going to fight for Armenia, Armenia could prepare stockpiles of everything needed for months of war, and develop a domestic defense industry (which he encouraged diasporans to invest in as very profitable). It needed also to communicate better developments in the armed forces to the Armenian public. He gave the example of the Ministry of Defense trying to keep secret the construction of border defenses though Azerbaijani sources have images of this.

Tadevosyan agreed with the prior speakers that defense capabilities and diplomacy had to be pursued but pointed out that domestic politics is also interconnected with security issues. Deep divisions within society, including low trust towards government and problems of social cohesion needed to be addressed by the Armenian government and other actors, she said. Armenia does not have a vision for the future and what peace means for it, so internal conversations and dialogues are necessary. It needs an updated national security strategy or doctrine for the longer term. She also declared that NGOs in Armenia should not all be considered Soros-funded organizations, but rather partners in building the security of Armenia.

Setrakian then asked Hamilton how could Armenia keep itself secure until it could be more defense-capable. Hamilton declared that relying on external security guarantors was not the way. Russia proved itself an unreliable partner, while NATO is not possible for a variety of reasons. Instead, Hamilton reiterated the words of prior panelists that Armenia must build territorial defense capability and be ready to adopt a total defense approach such as the porcupine or poisoned shrimp models. This means the enemy might swallow you but it can’t digest you. A large reserve force dispersed throughout the country, with stockpiles of all types of supplies, would leverage all aspects of the government and economy for military use in case of invasion.

Hamilton advised watching the Ukraine conflict closely to learn lessons because the changes in warfare are occurring at light speed on both sides. At present, he thought the defensive form of warfare appears dominant, which would be to Armenia’s advantage. Also, he pointed to Ukrainian civil society donations to the military as partners with the public sector in defense funding as an example that Armenia could follow.

Hamilton cited the Georgian state’s example of losing political will to transform its military along a Western model, and in order to avoid this, suggested Armenians encourage Western powers to not only provide training at the tactical level, but also work at the executive level and create a generating force to sustain capabilities and political will.

Brownback and America’s Conservative Outreach
The final portion of the APRI was a discussion with former Sen. Sam Brownback (R), who was senator from Kansas from 1996 to 2011, Kansas governor from 2011-18, and US Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom from 2018 to 2021. Brownback currently serves as co-chair of the International Religious Freedom Summit and is a senior fellow at Global Christian Relief. He is also chairman of the National Committee for Religious Freedom.

Setrakian introduced Brownback and then asked how he saw the current situation in the South Caucasus. Brownback said he found it to be a powder keg region with Iran, Turkey and Russia active players. He termed Russia, Iran, China and North Korea the axis of evil, and going further than Jaishankar’s Cold War diagnosis earlier in the day, declared, “I actually think World War III has begun, if we don’t play right through the next 6-18 months…wisely.”

How to do that? He exclaimed: “I think we got to project the toughness that you’re not going to mess with us. We’re going to stand up and we’re going to do what we need to do. Texans have a saying, and it’s not polite, but you got a good sheriff in town and you got a lot of bad things going on. He goes and he shoots one of the bad guys and he drives around town with the body in the back of the pickup. It says I mean business.” Ultimately, he said China is the puppet master behind many conflicts, including in the Middle East and involving Russia.

Setrakian asked about what could happen when Armenia reaches out to Christian communities in the US with a voice in foreign policy. Brownback said, “I wouldn’t be coy about it. I would say I think you have got a lot of friends. I don’t think you’ve talked to them that much…You’re the oldest Christian nation on the planet. Nobody else has that distinction….I’ve referred to you as the Israel of Christendom. You don’t market that.” He added, “I thought, man, you guys ought to just be reaching out and saying, this is part of the body of Christ and you need to be helping us and we need your help, and you used to do it. You did it back in 1915 with the genocide that took place.”

He cited the Save Armenia coalition meeting with Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Christians in Washington in September as a positive example, remarking that he had never before seen a grouping of the three denominations reaching out to support one country. Brownback is on the board of directors of Save Armenia, and he later mentioned a trip it hosted for a group of Christian and Jewish leaders to Armenia a year and a half ago in which he participated, declaring, “I think you need to invite people to your house.”

Setrakian asked whether the aforementioned outreach to Christians was enough to move the US to do more for the defense of Armenia, given Armenia’s lack of strategic value compared to other countries or parts of the world. Though not fully answering the question, Brownback responded by questioning the lack of strategic value, because, he said Armenia was actually in the middle of a key region, with Islamist Turkey, Russia and Iran (which he termed “the antagonist in the Middle East). He implied that it was important for the US to have a stable partner, so, he said, “I think really a key piece for you guys long term is just political stability of Armenia, and staying with it.” He also pointed out Georgia as a counterexample of a country that lost the political will.

Setrakian asked in a tactful way for Brownback to explain his evolution of his views on the South Caucasus. Without spelling it out, she was alluding to the change from his prior ardent support for Azerbaijani (and oil) interests while in the Senate, including efforts to circumvent Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act passed in 1992 to prohibit direct US assistance to Azerbaijan as long as the latter continued the blockade of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.

Brownback first quoted Ronald Reagan on his change from Democrat to Republican, when he said “I didn’t leave the Democratic Party — it left me.” Brownback specified that he meant that Armenia used to be closely aligned with Russia but then it changed. He recalled as an example that when he proposed the Silk Road Strategy Act in Congress at the end of the 1990s, this was an effort to avoid countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus from falling back into the Russian sphere or being pulled into an Islamic one. He said, “one of the barriers was the blockage towards Azerbaijan in the 907 sanctions, and Armenia wasn’t interested in playing ball on this because they [sic] were closely tied with Russia.”

Now, referring to what he perceived as a Westward shift in Armenia’s political alignments, he said, “You left a big ship … [or] they left you and you’re swimming in an ocean full of sharks trying to get to another ship. But I mean you want to build your own boat too.”

Setrakian concluded by expressing appreciation for the work of the Save Armenia coalition and Brownback’s participation in this. Brownback in turn replied, “Thank you, and thank you for being Armenian. When I traveled to your country I read a small book on the brief history of Armenia. You’ve got too much history.” Noting that it was a tough spot, he finished by thanking Armenians “for hanging in there.”

For more information on APRI Armenia, see its website, https://apri.institute.