Over the past year, the Trump administration has been actively advancing its geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus and beyond. This has occurred under conditions in which the historical roles of Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus have significantly weakened.
In recent decades, Russia exercised real influence in the region. As for Iran, its influence was shaped less by direct political, economic, or military presence and more by the fact that neighboring states could not ignore Tehran’s interests when shaping their foreign policies and bilateral relations with other players. Today, however, the situation has changed substantially for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is difficult to assess to what extent Iran’s concerns are taken into account by Yerevan—and even less so by Baku. Moreover, the complex internal and external challenges currently facing Iran further complicate its ability to secure and sustain its role in the South Caucasus, even in terms of having its interests formally considered by its neighbors.
As for Russia, the situation is also complicated. President Ilham Aliyev has openly accused Russia of adopting an unfriendly stance toward Azerbaijan and has shaped his foreign policy narrative accordingly, thereby reducing Russian leverage over Baku. At the same time, Russia has significantly lost its instruments of influence and pressure over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while in Georgia it still lacks decisive influence.
In other words, whereas the South Caucasus once operated under a relative balance — Turkey as Azerbaijan’s political patron, Russia as Armenia’s, and the collective West as Georgia’s primary partner — that equilibrium has now been disrupted. The roughly 25-year balance has effectively collapsed. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the 2022 war in Ukraine, and several additional factors led to a substantial decline in Russia’s influence over Armenia, as well as a weakening of the collective West’s influence in Georgia. Turkey, however, managed not only to preserve but even to expand its influence over both Azerbaijan and Georgia, particularly in the economic sphere, while gradually acquiring additional leverage in Armenia.
This configuration has also enabled Azerbaijan to emerge as the local power in the South Caucasus, with all the implications that follow.
Against this backdrop, over the past year we have witnessed an unprecedented activation of the Trump administration in the South Caucasus. This is unprecedented in several respects. First, no previous U.S. administration had succeeded in establishing such deep influence in the region — primarily due to the weakening of Russia and Iran. Second, conditions have emerged that allow the United States to promote the development of a Central Asia–Europe connectivity corridor that bypasses Russia, effectively pushing Moscow out of key regional positions.
