At the end of December, I wrote on my Facebook page that Armenia would soon be visited by the highest-ranking American official in its history. Although I did not disclose who that official would be, I emphasized that a visit at this level had never occurred before. I noted that this would be a historic event, as previously the highest-ranking American officials to have visited Armenia were the Speaker of the US House of Representatives and US Secretaries of State James Baker and Hillary Clinton.
Information regarding Vice President J. D. Vance’s visit was not denied by either the Armenian or the American side, which indicated that my information was accurate. Only days later, US President Donald Trump made a post on his social media account announcing that preparations were underway for Vice President Vance’s visit not only to Armenia but also to Azerbaijan.
To the best of my knowledge, an Azerbaijan visit was not initially planned. From the outset, Vance was expected to only visit Yerevan, as well as Syunik, where the so-called “Trump route” is currently under construction. Days before President Trump’s social media post, a meeting took place between Trump and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Davos. Immediately following that meeting, Trump announced on his social media platform Truth Social: “We will strengthen our strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, a beautiful Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with Armenia, deals for our great semiconductor makers, and the sale of Made in the U.S.A. defense equipment, such as body armor and boats, and more, to Azerbaijan.”
It was notable that Trump did not hold a bilateral meeting with Pashinyan while the latter was in Davos. The impression was that with regard to Armenia, all key decisions had already been made and there was no need to discuss anything. Trump’s statement revealed a distinct imbalance in Armenian–American and US–Azerbaijani relations.
Specifically, in the Washington–Baku dimension, the statement clearly articulated concrete and practical components of cooperation — deepening strategic partnership, the sale of defense equipment, and the expansion of
security cooperation. As for Armenia, the proposed area of cooperation is the nuclear sector, particularly new small modular nuclear station technologies that I have had the opportunity to discuss previously. However, even within US expert and professional circles, there is an understanding that these technologies still require further development and testing before they can be deployed at scale.
A legitimate question arises: why is Armenia avoiding acquiring weapons, ammunition, or other military technologies from the United States, as Azerbaijan has done? If Armenia is able to purchase military equipment from France and India, why does it not do the same with the US, in order to elevate its relations with Washington to a new strategic level? Of course, US legislation and bureaucracy are quite complex when it comes to such transactions, but these obstacles can be overcome.
