In recent weeks, there has been intense discussion surrounding developments related to Iran. US President Donald Trump was presented with various options for potential military action against Iran, including strikes targeting specific military facilities or strategically significant sites. However, no final decision had been made by the Trump administration. The administration appeared to have adopted a wait-and-see approach, observing what outcomes the protesters themselves might achieve independently. At the same time, President Trump announced that any country continuing to conduct business with the Islamic Republic of Iran would be subjected to a 25 percent tariff on all trade with the United States.
In turn, the US Virtual Embassy in Tehran urged American citizens to leave Iran as soon as possible via Turkey or Armenia. Historically, such warnings have often preceded possible airstrikes or broader military campaigns that could lead to regime change in Iran. Notably, when asked whether he believed that the Shah of Iran’s son could become Iran’s next leader, Trump responded that this was not necessary and that it would be more prudent to wait and see whether any local forces might emerge and assert themselves.
It was natural that one of the largest protest movements in Iran’s history was closely monitored by both Israel and the United States. When major external actors sense that it may be possible to influence events or further destabilize the situation in Iran, they almost certainly consider acting in that direction. Despite this, the US president and several senior officials from his administration repeatedly issued warnings and threats regarding potential strikes against Iran. In fact, President Trump himself made at least six or seven statements or public posts of this nature during that period.
The potential collapse of Iran’s current government would, of course, have created far-reaching consequences for the region, extending well beyond internal instability. The weakening of a strong central authority typically produces a power vacuum, often leading to the emergence of religious and ethnic divisions — an outcome that is entirely plausible in Iran. A key question remains whether, following a change in power, Iran would be able to preserve its territorial integrity or whether it would follow the path of numerous other states that lost territory due to revolutions, internal fragmentation, and civil or ethnic conflicts in parts of the Middle East. Clearly, no country — including multi-ethnic Iran — is fully insulated from such risks.
A disruption of Iran’s territorial integrity or prolonged destabilization would not serve Armenia’s interests. First, Iran is home to a significant Armenian community. Second, instability could generate large-scale population movements, placing minorities and migrants at particular risk. For Armenia, Iran has long been a friendly neighbor with centuries of shared history. Any deterioration of the situation in Iran would have direct implications for Armenia’s economy and security. Moreover, in the event of Iran’s fragmentation, the emergence of a new Azerbaijani-influenced entity along Armenia’s border could not be ruled out. It should also be noted that ethnic Azerbaijanis comprise approximately 20 percent of Iran’s total population.
Such a scenario would largely align with the interests of Ankara and Baku, given their connections with Azerbaijani communities in Iran and their potential influence over them. At the same time, the weakening of Iran would have meant an expansion of Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus — a development that historically has only been counterbalanced by a strong and unified Iran.
