Turkey’s approach to Armenia appears to involve obstructing measures that would genuinely benefit the Armenian state while simultaneously undertaking actions that could help the current Armenian government win the 2026 elections. The approach leaves the impression that Armenian-Turkish normalization and the unblocking of Armenia are near completion while avoiding concrete actions that would genuinely benefit Armenia’s national interests, thus highlighting a divergence between the interests of Armenia and its current government. By June, when Armenia’s elections are held, Turkey will likely implement superficial measures presented by Armenian authorities as significant achievements, but which will essentially be for PR purposes. Examples include initiating or pre-signing (but not ratifying) protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and border openings or easing border restrictions for third-country citizens or cargo; introducing new airlines to the Armenian aviation market; and restoring some Armenian churches in modern Turkish cities.
Only recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that Turkey will only normalize relations with Armenia with Baku’s approval. Consequently, significant progress depends on Armenia’s upcoming elections and referendum, as a strong, legitimate Armenian government is crucial for Turkey and Azerbaijan to advance their agenda and ensure the strongest legitimacy of any signed agreements. Furthermore, Turkish support would make the Armenian government dependent on Ankara, which appears to be a deliberate part of Turkey’s strategy.
It is clear that the Armenian authorities need to show the public that the six years of Armenian-Turkish negotiations have not only made progress but have also had concrete successes. This issue is an extremely important prerequisite in the pre-election phase for the Pashinyan government. While Turkey emphasizes improved relations with Baku as a precondition for normalization with Armenia, this isn’t the full picture. Meeting Turkey’s preconditions, beyond removing the Mount Ararat image from Armenia’s coat of arms and ceasing use of “Western and Eastern Armenia,” would require Armenia to amend its constitution via referendum. Azerbaijan has already officially demanded this from Armenia, so Turkey does not need to reiterate the precondition of constitutional change. Armenia will likely satisfy Turkish preconditions if it formally normalizes relations with Azerbaijan after changing its constitution.
Turkish strategy for normalizing relations with Armenia is well thought out. The strategy is a calculated maneuver aimed at Armenia, and it seeks to cultivate the international perception that Turkey is actively pursuing normalized relations. Historically, Turkey has often taken such steps, particularly before April 24, to mislead the international community and undermine recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Currently, Turkey aims to feign normalization while prolonging the process to extract maximum concessions from Armenia with a little help from Baku.
Turkey and Azerbaijan pursue a coordinated foreign policy as fraternal Turkic states with largely overlapping interests. Azerbaijan relies on Turkey to expand its influence in the South Caucasus, counterbalancing Iran and Russia, while Turkey supports Baku’s firm stance against Russia. Despite appearances of warming relations, exemplified by the recent Putin-Aliyev meeting, Azerbaijan’s continued detention of Russian citizens, a point of ongoing contention for the Russian Foreign Ministry, underscores this alignment. This unified approach extends beyond facilitating direct contact with Turkic states in Central Asia to include the opening of the South Caucasus and the so-called Zangezur corridor.
