Syunik red highlighted in map of Armenia

Iranian-Israeli conflict highlights Armenia’s difficult geopolitical position

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By Seamus Duffy

It is too early to say whether an uneasy ceasefire between Iran and Israel will hold, granting Armenia a reprieve from the ominous strategic implications of the conflict. With the prospect of continued war hanging over Tehran, Armenia may find itself cut off from a crucial trade outlet, as well as have a weakened ability to resist Russian and Azerbaijani diplomatic pressure on issues with significant implications for Armenian sovereignty.

Prior to the start of the Iranian-Israeli conflict on June 13, Iran could be considered Armenia’s sole reliable trade link to the outside world, and even then, the Iranian route was plagued by bottlenecks. Turkish and Azerbaijani borders remain largely closed to Armenian trade, and Georgia in recent months has taken action – some analysts believe at the behest of the Kremlin – to disrupt Russia-bound exports.

Armenian trade turnover already has taken a big hit so far this year due to a Kremlin decision to curtail Armenia’s re-export of gems and precious metals; any reduction of exports via Iranian routes could only exacerbate Yerevan’s trade woes.

Iran also has been a crucial diplomatic backer of Armenia in the ongoing wrangling over the Zangezur Corridor, a proposed land bridge across Armenian territory that would connect Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhichevan exclave. To date, Armenia has adamantly opposed giving Azerbaijan any extraterritorial privileges on the Zangezur route, and Iranian officials feel the establishment of a corridor would jeopardize trade ties along the two nations’ “strategic“ border.

Armenian observers now worry that Baku, judging Iran to be strategically debilitated, may try to increase the diplomatic and military pressure on Yerevan.

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“Iran has long played a pivotal role in preserving Armenia’s territorial integrity and preventing the establishment of the ‘Zangezur Corridor,’” wrote Yeghia Tashjian, in a commentary published by Armenian Weekly, adding that “Baku and Ankara view Tehran’s weakness as a window of opportunity to exert pressure on a regionally isolated Armenia.”

The issue seems important enough for Iran that, even as Tehran was exchanging rocket barrages with Israel, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on June 17 cautioned Azerbaijan against taking any unilateral action, characterizing the Zangezur issue as a “redline” for Iran.

It is far from certain at this point whether such Iranian rhetoric is sufficient to deter Baku. Ilham Aliyev’s administration seems intent on keeping its options open, while ratcheting up the pressure on Yerevan.  On June 14, a presidential foreign policy adviser, Hikmet Hajiyev, called on Armenia to “take the first significant step toward opening the Zangezur Corridor.” And in remarks delivered in Baku on June 18, Aliyev stated that Armenia should facilitate the return of Azerbaijanis to what Azerbaijan describes as the West Zangezur region, or Armenia’s Syunik Province. Aliyev claims that hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were forcibly pushed out of the area during the early 20th century.

“Historical justice requires ensuring the peaceful and safe return of these people to their homeland,” Aliyev stated.

While menacing Armenia, Azerbaijani officials took steps to reassure Iran that their country would remain on the sidelines in the Iranian-Israeli confrontation, despite Baku’s strong defense and security ties with Israel. In a June 14 phone conversation with Araghchi, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated Azerbaijan “will under no circumstances allow its airspace or territory to be used for attacks against Iran or any other countries,” Iran’s Mehr New Agency reported.

Azerbaijani trade is also threatened by the Iranian-Israeli conflict, especially along the North-South corridor, which handles goods moving from Asia via Iran and Azerbaijan to Russia. Iran is the key node in the network. Although far from fully developed, the North-South corridor is an important lifeline for the Kremlin, which uses it to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions and keep its war effort in Ukraine going. Trade along the corridor boomed in 2024, especially trans-Caspian, bilateral commerce between Iran and Russia.

The Kremlin remains acutely interested in continuing the development of the North-South network. “No matter how this conflict unfolds, after the war is over, this project will continue to be implemented,” the official TASS news agency quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying.

A developing East-West trade route involving Iran and Azerbaijan, known as the Aras Corridor, also seems vulnerable to disruption. The Aras route is projected as an alternative to the Zangezur option, traversing Iranian territory to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, with an onward link to Turkey. The Iranian-Israeli conflict could prompt Azerbaijani officials to conclude the Aras route is untenable, thus increasing their determination to secure Zangezur.

Russia — which is angling for a role as a security guarantor for Zangezur, enabling Moscow to retain a strong on-the-ground security presence in the Caucasus — may well join Azerbaijan in pressing for an Armenian concession. Russia also is seeking additional leverage to prevent Armenia from making a geopolitical pivot away from the Kremlin toward the West.

(Seamus Duffy is a JD-PhD candidate at the University of Chicago who currently works as a Summer Associate at the Office of the Representative on International Legal Matters for the Republic of Armenia. The analysis contained in this article represents the author’s personal views, and in no way reflects the official policy or position of the Office of the Representative on International Legal Matters or the Republic of Armenia. This analysis originally appeared on www.eurasianet.org on June 24.)

 

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