Dangerously Omitted Information: Challenging Sassounian’s Narrative of the Artak Tovmasyan Case

Compared to the clunky MRAPs and poorly armored LATVs, in support of Sassounian’s point, the APCs and possibly the SUTs produced by STREIT would be expected provide greater utility amidst battles. Before adopting Sassounian’s conclusion prematurely, however, one would need to identify whether the STREIT APCs like the Cobra would be superior to the modern Russian-made GAZ Tigr APCs employed by the Armenian armed forces. Compared to the STREIT vehicles, the GAZ Tigr has the added benefit of being capable of incorporating other Russian military armaments already in Armenia’s arsenal, including but not limited to specific radar systems and surface to air missile launchers.

In conclusion, if STREIT’s vehicles are not superior to the current assets, at best, additional armored STREIT vehicles in Armenia’s arsenal would solely be capable of serving as second-rate, emergency-use or auxiliary vehicles in war. In the best-case scenario, they could replace the vehicles destroyed or lost in battle, while at worst they would possess penetrable, inadequate armor incapable of resisting enemy projectiles, thus jeopardizing the lives of Armenian soldiers if they ultimately prove unreliable and penetrable in combat. Indeed, the weekend he authored the article, in order to assess whether the armor of the vehicles could hold up and save “the lives of countless Armenian soldiers,” Mr. Sassounian did not check or assess whether the STREIT APCs could resist the blast of an armor-piercing smart micro munition high explosive (MAM-C) or thermobaric (MAM-L) missile. Rather than make premature statements on matters of defense, it would have been obligatory to carry out an investigation as to whether the STREIT vehicles possess or lack that capacity to resist the deadliest tools in Azerbaijan’s arsenal: the subset of Bayraktar TB2 missiles capable of puncturing vehicles (like tanks) that are significantly more heavily armored than APCs or MRAPs, be it from STREIT or from another arms supplier. So whether they’d be able to save “countless” lives as Sassounian claims, particularly concerning deadly attacks from Bayraktars above, the overwhelming cause of Armenian human and equipment casualties during the recent NK war, the answer would clearly be: No.

The pedestrian idea that armored troop transport vehicles have complete utility in battle and would save countless lives ignores the fact that during the war, the larger size of the vehicles made for easier targets for laser-guided loitering munitions, as evidenced by the drone footage released by the Azerbaijani military. In the armored vehicles STREIT and other similar defense contractors produce, soldiers are not spread out meters apart but are bunched together. If using the drone footage as evidence, we can see the proximity of the soldiers inside these vehicles proved to be a wartime liability following the sundering and disruption of Armenia’s air defense system. By blowing up an armored vehicle, a single Baykraktar missile could eliminate up to a dozen of Armenian soldiers rather than just a scattered few. This is precisely why on numerous occasions amidst the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, battle-wise Armenian soldiers often opted to reposition on foot, as the strongest odds of survival frequently consisted of traversing by foot when the airfield was a haven for drones. Later videos published by the Azerbaijani military confirm this to have been the case, recording large caches of tanks and troop transport vehicles being left behind. Some of these vehicles were paraded in Azerbaijan’s despicable victory park. But all proper analyses are nuanced, rather than one sided. It may very well be that the armored vehicles STREIT produces could become useful, but only if hegemonic domination of the battlefield shifts from air to ground and a hard counter to the Bayraktars is acquired. The only other useful scenario would be STREIT vehicles serving a different purpose altogether — the bare minimum of being impromptu or improvised ‘mobile-bunkers’, i.e. barriers or covers for soldiers engaged in small arms fire in urban combat environments.

However, given the lack of expertise on military analysis, the omission of analysis on Sassounian’s part is not as inexcusable as the failure to mention the easily pondered geopolitical consequences of a STREIT factory. STREIT military vehicles are Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 3 NATO certified. A NATO-graded certification is not handed out like confetti. If the STREIT factories were built in Armenia, there would need to be repeat inspection and tests of their products by NATO investigators. The challenge therefore would be whether the creation of a STREIT factory is thereby legal and not in violation of Armenia’s contractual agreements with the Collective Security Treaty Organization. And if it was in fact legal, given Armenia’s membership in the military alliance, would there not be potential unwelcome political ramifications or consequences in allowing NATO personnel direct access to the hardware built in and employed by a CSTO member state? Sassounian fails to explore this possibility and the legal or geopolitical hurdles that could obstruct such a deal. That’s not to say NATO-Armenia cooperation is impossible, as NATO delegations have visited the country with the intention of bolstering cooperation with Armenia, maintaining friendly relations, and addressing areas of military edification on some other occasions. But no event is without some degree of geopolitical consequences, and one would be wise to note the infrequency of such visitations, none of which reach the level of cooperation whereby NATO investigators would visit and have direct access to armament factories in a CSTO member state.

There is another matter altogether. Why would STREIT choose Armenia in particular? While I see no reason to doubt that Tovmasyan’s stated intention of establishing an Armenian branch is intended to contribute to his homeland, motivations are often plural, multifarious, and intertwined. Geopolitics could be at play behind the scenes, and STREIT’s utility to NATO’s interest of curbing CSTO geopolitical influence is a line of thought to be explored.

Let’s consult a case study. STREIT works very closely with Kremenchuk Automobile Plant, a Ukrainian armored vehicle producer, in producing vehicles that have seen combat operations against Russia and Russian-backed separatists in Crimea and Donbas. The plant also sells armored vehicles to NATO superpowers like the United States. For these reasons, one can surmise the proposal for the construction of a STREIT factory in Armenia was submitted with the intention of partially drawing Armenia away from future Russian arms purchases and towards Western companies, at least in this subsection of military hardware consisting of armored personnel carriers.