Karabakh Conflict at Crossroads

Pashinyan’s statement that he was not mandated by the Karabakh people’s vote to negotiate on their behalf should not be construed to mean that there is an erosion in Armenia’s determination to guarantee Karabakh people’s security and self-determination.

Although the Minsk group co-chairs tell the two sides that no new element can be introduced to impede the negotiating process, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova has stated that Moscow would be willing to entertain Pashinyan’s wish, if both parties agree to it. And this, she has added is the position of all the co-chairs.

All along, the meetings have been characterized as discussions. When the parties engage in negotiations, rather than discussions, recording every element of agreement in the process, Karabakh cannot be left out because its signature will be necessary on the final document.

Currently a very healthy public debate is taking place with the participation of representatives from Pashinyan’s movement and the former regime, incredibly with minimal incrimination against each other.

The press statements of the co-chairs come with a preamble admonishing the parties “to reduce tensions and reduce inflammatory rhetoric.” This refers to Azerbaijan and particularly to Mr. Aliyev. On the other hand, they ask “to refrain from statement and actions suggesting significant changes to the situation on the ground.”

This, in turn, refers to Pashinyan’s insistence on the participation of Karabakh representatives in the negotiations.

Some analysts believe that by the above position, Armenia has been pushing itself into an untenable situation, since Aliyev has refused that proposal out of hand. But Armenia maintains a flexible position by its willingness to engage in negotiations, even without Karabakh’s participation.

Historically, the negotiations have been between three parties: even the cease fire negotiated in Bishkek in 1994 was signed by a Karabakh representative. Armenia has been alone in the negotiations against Azerbaijan since 1997, because Presidents Robert Kocharyan  and later Serzh Sargsyan had worn double hats by virtue of their participation in the Karabakh war as leaders.

The trickiest part of the negotiation is contained in the principles laid down in the statement of the co-chairs. Those principles have been discussed time and again in many prior sessions in Madrid, Kazan, Geneva, Key West, and on and on. But today, they have become as crystalized and rigid as final terms for the parties to accept.

The following are those terms:

• The return of the territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan’s control
• An interim status for Nagorno Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance.
• A corridor linking Armenia with Nagorno Karabagh
• Future determination of the final legal statue of Nagorno Karabakh through a legally-binding expression of will.
• International guarantees that would include a peace-keeping operation.

As one may detect easily, these principles mostly favor Azerbaijan. Whatever Azerbaijan could not achieve on the battleground, it is trying to achieve at the negotiation table with the help of the international community. The party which has lost the war is being offered the upper hand.

This reminds one of the aftermath of World War I, when a defeated Turkey was allowed to resurrect itself as one of the most powerful nations in the Middle East, courtesy of the Great Powers.

The above principles come with many loopholes and they need further explanation and exploration. That is why the Armenian side has requested clarification on all the points.

Whatever the Armenian side will lose in the compromise is irreversible. Any territory ceded can only be reconquered through new bloodshed. And vague promises of future autonomy are a non-starter for people who have experienced Baku’s pogroms of 1903 and 1920, as well as in Sumgait and Baku in 1988. A generation which was born and brought up after the Karabakh in an independent, albeit non-recognized republic, will never submit willingly to go back under the Azeri yoke.

Armenians have to be extremely careful in defining the term “self-determination,” in which Mr. Aliyev is offering to the people of Karabakh his utopian vision of the “highest degree of autonomy.” Karabakh is an independent state now and cannot return to the status of an autonomous region under Azeri rule.

There are three fundamental principles and six elements for settlements. The three principles are peaceful methods of negotiations, the principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination.

We have issues with the last two principles. The term self-determination is so vague that even Stalin believed that he was granting self-determination to the Karabakh citizens when he defined the Nagorno Karabakh Oblast and handed it as an enclave to Azerbaijan.

On the other hand, the Secretary of the Security Council of Karabakh and the commander of the troops during the war, Vitaly Balassanian, goes as far as to question Azerbaijan’s contention regarding territorial integrity by stating, “Azerbaijan’s territory is very dubious. This country must first prove to the international community what territory it is talking about. This is a very disputable issue and I am convinced that when Artsakh comes forth as a full negotiating side, we will necessarily raise this issue.”

While Armenia is gearing up for the negotiations, calls are getting louder and louder that we have to be ready for war if we wish to achieve peace. Our constant yearning for peace is interpreted on the Turkish side as a weakness. Pashinyan made a very succinct remark that if Armenia is for peace, Azerbaijan’s people also vie for peace.