Diaspora: A Function of Armenia’s Foreign Policy

One of the more active groups in Europe is the European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy, headed by Hilda Chobanian. Effective advocacy is carried out by this group in Brussels and in other European centers.

Armenian political groups almost always operate independently of other similar groups if not in direct competition with each other. In France, that trend has been tamed and opposing Armenian groups work under the umbrella of the Coordination Committee of Organizations in France (CCAF), headed by Ara Toranian and Mourad Papazian.

More recently, the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) launched an advocacy program for human rights in Europe headed by Nadia Gortzounian and Nicolas Davidian. Other individuals and groups have also been in the lobbying business elsewhere in Europe — in Switzerland, Germany, Greece and the Scandinavian countries. The coordination of the activities of these groups with Armenia’s foreign policy establishment is questionable. Most of the times, Armenia’s embassies in those countries fail to perform coordinating roles.

Turkey and Azerbaijan

Turkey and Azerbaijan have laid a blockade around Armenia and they represent an existential threat to the latter. Armenia has no other choice but to use frontal diplomacy with these two countries. Azerbaijan runs media programs in Armenia to present its case to a hostile audience there and yet Armenia fails to launch similar actions.

Azerbaijan is a multi-ethnic society comprising Lezgis, Talish, Kurds and other minorities which have been oppressed and many of their leaders languish in jail. There is no policy in place in Armenia to speak in defense of those persecuted minorities which could become political assets eventually.

Turkey’s case is different. Onetime enemies of the Armenians, the Kurds have become allies through necessity. Sooner or later, a Kurdistan will emerge within Turkey’s current borders either as an independent country or an autonomous region. Kurdish claims cover part of historic Armenia. Armenians may not be entitled to share a piece of those Kurdish lands but accommodations may be made with them to preserve Armenian cultural and architectural heritage in an eventually liberated Kurdistan, if proper and prudent relations are established with them. Unlike Armenians, the Kurds still occupy their lands and thus they have 90 percent of the argument on their side.

Armenians can also create a factor on the land by awakening the dormant and hidden Armenians in the eastern parts of modern Turkey. Broadcasts beaming to that population may awaken their sublimated identities which have been oppressed by the Turkish government and society in general. Programs in Armenian, Turkish, Kurdish and Hamshen Armenian presenting their history and heritage will do the job and Armenians may also develop a contingent on their ancestral lands and use it as a political factor.

Georgian Challenge

Armenia has very special and sensitive relations with Georgia, the only other Christian nation in the region. But the Georgians always side with Armenia’s enemies, Turkey and Azerbaijan, knowing full well that their exercises are directed against Armenia. Even the deliberate choking point at Upper Lars customs gate, the only passage from Armenia to Russia, is a compliment and complement to the blocking countries’ policy.

Javakhk Armenians are persecuted and pushed to leave their historic homeland and Armenian churches are confiscated. Additionally, Georgia participates in all oil and gas lines and rail networks that deliberately isolate Armenia. Yet, Armenia’s government has a cautious policy toward its troubling neighbor. It is formatted as follows: “Armenia does not have any problems with Georgia that cannot be resolved.” Yet they are not resolved.

If the Armenian government ships textbooks to Javakhk schools, that will reflect in the balance sheet of Georgia-Armenian official relations.

Therefore, the challenge is for the Diaspora Armenians to do the following:

1. To send representatives to stir awareness of national identity, like those sent by some Western countries to promote color revolutions.
2. To support Javakhk’s ailing economy to staunch the outflow of the population.
3. To develop public awareness through media and demonstrations in the West about the usurpation of churches and persecution of the Armenians.

These are some actions that Diaspora Armenians can take which official diplomacy in Yerevan is incapable of doing.

The Diaspora can become an effective extension of Armenia’s foreign policy, if it is mobilized and politicized enough, with a clear political agenda of its own.