Commentary: The Population Weapon

In Muslim countries polygamy is standard practice and it contributes significantly to the population growth. As a

Muslim country, Turkey’s population grew at a faster pace and now it is over 70 million. Parallel economic progress has justified the population growth, although out of 70 million, 20 million are Kurds who have become, over the years, more and more assertive of their ethnic identity.

On the other hand, Egypt’s overpopulation has become a national trauma, because the economy does not keep pace with the population growth. Birth control is a voluntary option for Egyptian families and it is not encouraged by the religious authorities. With the recent emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, that problem can only be compounded, as the fundamentalist party will try to impose on the country Sharia law.

In its December 10 issue, the New York Times ran a feature article about the population problem in Nagorno Karabagh, under the title, “The National Womb.” The article refers to a recent government program to encourage population growth, because, the ethnic profile of the Karabagh Republic is a critical one, well beyond economy and politics. The future of that tiny republic hinges on its population retention and growth. The Times has also given some statistics which seem to be disappointing: “Since its introduction four years ago, the birth encouragement program has been credited for an increase in births, 2,694 in 2010 from 2,145 in 2007. The program pays each couple about $780 at their wedding and then an additional $260 for the first baby, $520 for the second, $1,300 for the third and $1,820 for the fourth. Families with six or more children under the age of 18 are given a house. These payments are quite substantial in a region where an average monthly salary is $50.” The above statistics demonstrate that the population growth has been at a snail’s pace; only an incremental growth in three years, yet Karabagh’s future depend on its population growth.

Throughout all the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, under the auspices of the Minsk Group, a referendum has been one of the sticking points. Azerbaijan insists that in order to have a national referendum, Karabagh’s Armenian population, along with Azerbaijan’s 7-million population should participate to determine the future status of Karabagh. In that scenario, it is obvious what the outcome would be. The Armenian side maintains that referendum must be limited to the Karabagh population. In this case, the outcome can also be predicted very easily. But there is an inherent danger here. Even if the exiled Azeri population returns to Karabagh to participate in the referendum, their numbers could have increased to dangerous levels, because, even in refugee camps, the Azeri population can grow at a faster pace than the Armenian population, without counting the decrease of Armenian population due to the youth seeking employment in foreign countries. There is also a caveat in this scenario; the Armenian side maintains pre-war ratio of 20 percent to 30 percent in favor of the Armenian population.

No one knows exactly the number of Karabagh’s current population and no one wishes to know. The generally-accepted figure is 180,000.