Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan

US–Russia Talks: Implications for Armenia–Azerbaijan Negotiations

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The promise to end the war in Ukraine quickly was one of Donald J. Trump’s main campaign pledges. Upon returning to the White House in January 2025, the president began taking steps toward this goal. The world witnessed a whirlwind of negotiations: face-to-face meetings between Mr. Trump’s envoy, Steven Witkoff, and Russian President Vladimir Putin; multiple phone calls between Mr. Trump and Presidents Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky; direct US–Russia and US–Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia; and a tense meeting in the Oval Office with Mr. Zelensky.

As a result, Russia and Ukraine agreed to suspend attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure for one month. Negotiations are now underway for a broader ceasefire. It is too early to assess the likelihood of a complete and lasting ceasefire — let alone the prospects for a comprehensive peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

On several key issues, the sides maintain diametrically opposing positions. Russia demands recognition of territories it declared part of the Russian Federation in 2022, as well as Crimea, restrictions on the Ukrainian armed forces, and the formal adoption of Ukraine’s neutrality. Ukraine, in turn, insists it will never recognize Russian control over any of its territory, will not accept limits on its military, and will not remove NATO membership from its foreign policy agenda.

Nevertheless, the mere fact of direct US–Russia talks — and Mr. Trump’s statements about normalizing relations with Russia and the need for Ukraine to accept some territorial losses — has significantly impacted global geopolitics. Regional developments in many parts of the world have been affected, and the South Caucasus is no exception. In recent years the region has become a microcosm of the emerging post-unipolar world order, shaped by the competing and overlapping interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States, the European Union, Israel, France, Britain, India, China, and Pakistan.

Current Stage of Armenia–Azerbaijan Negotiations

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, the onset of the Russia–Ukraine War, and Azerbaijan’s 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh — accompanied by forced displacement of the Armenian population — have significantly altered the regional balance of power. Confronted with an increasingly assertive Azerbaijan and the failure of both Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization to support it during Azerbaijani incursions, Armenia launched a “peace agenda” aimed at normalizing relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. Simultaneously, it began diversifying its foreign policy with a Western focus, deepening ties with the European Union, France, and the United States while strengthening relations with India and the Persian Gulf states.

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The Armenian government appeared to be positioning itself for a regional order marked by diminished Russian influence and greater engagement with the West — an outlook seemingly shaped by assessments in 2022 and 2023 predicting Russia’s eventual defeat in Ukraine.

As part of this peace agenda and to prevent further escalation by Azerbaijan, Armenia agreed in 2024 to Azerbaijani terms on border delimitation in the northern sector of the bilateral border. In early March 2025, it further accepted the Azerbaijani phrasing for the two remaining disputed articles of the peace agreement, thereby finalizing the text. Armenia then proposed to Azerbaijan that consultations begin on the timing and venue for signing the contract.

However, Azerbaijan insisted that the text would be signed only after Armenia fulfilled two preconditions: amending its Constitution and relevant laws and formally dissolving the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group. In addition, Azerbaijan has presented a broader list of demands — including establishing the so-called “Zangezur corridor” — any of which could be declared preconditions at any moment, effectively delaying or obstructing the peace process.

In recent days, Azerbaijan has actively disseminated false claims of ceasefire violations by the Armenian military, contributing to a tense atmosphere and potentially laying the groundwork for renewed escalation.

The Impact of US–Russia Talks

The launch of direct US–Russia talks has already influenced prevailing assessments regarding the potential outcome of the war in Ukraine. Few observers now argue that the conflict will conclude with a strategic defeat for Russia. At the same time, an increasing number contend that Ukraine must accept the loss of territory and abandon hopes of joining NATO in the foreseeable future. This paradigm shift has bolstered Russia’s image on the world stage, fostering a perception of a resilient power capable of withstanding the pressure of the collective West.

Should Russia and Ukraine reach a durable ceasefire, this perception will likely grow stronger, enabling Russia to gradually redirect resources toward protecting its interests in other areas of the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus. Such a development would reinforce Russia’s position as the most present actor in the region, limiting the ability of Turkey and other states to shape regional geopolitics. Concurrently, any potential decline in US involvement in the South Caucasus would allow Russia to reassert its role in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process — a role it has largely abandoned since late 2022, as Armenia and Azerbaijan probably would not be able to resist an emboldened Russia’s demands.

The Kremlin has already signaled its renewed interest in the region, expressing its intention to dispatch its special envoy, Igor Khovayev, to Armenia and Azerbaijan and offering to host negotiations between the two countries.

These developments may constrain Azerbaijan’s capacity to forcefully establish the so-called “Zangezur corridor” by occupying all or part of Armenia’s Syunik and Vayots Dzor regions. Such a move would significantly elevate Turkey’s regional role, countering Russia’s core strategic interests. Meanwhile, Russia wants to revive the trilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan–Russia working group on restoring regional communications, which has been dormant since the summer of 2023, to implement Article 9 of the November 2020 trilateral statement.

In the short term, the prospect of a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire could prompt Azerbaijan to escalate hostilities to secure the coveted corridor before Russia fully reestablishes its influence in the region. In the medium and long term, however, a ceasefire and the normalization of US–Russian relations might reestablish Russia’s dominance in the South Caucasus, limiting Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s ability to expand their influence further.

The Armenian government should carefully consider these possible scenarios. It must begin taking steps to establish a new modus operandi with Russia. At the same time, Yerevan should initiate consultations with all actors interested in the region’s stability — including the European Union, Russia, Iran, the United States, India, and China — to raise the alarm over Azerbaijan’s aggressive intentions and explore coordinated efforts to prevent renewed Azerbaijani escalation in the weeks and months ahead.

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