Suren Sargsyan

Armenia, CSTO, and Russia: A Struggle for Strategic Clarity

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In recent days, the issue of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has once again been brought into circulation, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia addressed it, stating that Armenia does not wish to return to the CSTO.

Armenia froze its membership in the CSTO two years ago, in February 2024. Since then, Armenia has not participated in the organization’s activities or in the adoption of its decisions. Recently, discussions surrounding the CSTO have intensified. Former CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha has stated that Armenia should be expelled from the organization, taking into account the political course adopted by the country, leading to the response of Armenia’s foreign minister noted above.

At the same time, Armenia has not made a clear statement about definitively withdrawing from the organization. There are also legal issues that need to be resolved in order to understand the mechanism through which Armenia could be expelled from the CSTO.

Of course, the CSTO and the EAEU are two different organizations with different charters, objectives, and tasks. Although Armenia has frozen its membership in the CSTO, it continues its relations with the EAEU. Moreover, the Armenian authorities state that, under the current circumstances, the country does not consider withdrawal from the EAEU appropriate.

In sum, a situation seems to be emerging in which Armenia and Russia are unable to make a clear decision about who should initiate the expulsion process for both organizations. Neither want to assume the initiative so neither side is taking concrete steps, although both sides recognize that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO is currently ineffective for Armenia and for the organization itself.

The EAEU is a rather interesting structure. In certain respects, it resembles a club of Turkic and Slavic countries. In fact, Armenia is the only state among the organization’s members that is neither Slavic nor Turkic. In the case of the CSTO as well, most member states are Turkic or Slavic countries, joined by Tajikistan, which is not a Turkic state, and Armenia, which is also not a Turkic state.

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Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO could serve as a precedent for other countries, and Moscow understands this. It also understands that in Central Asia, whose members Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are facing strong competition for influence among the United States, China, and Russia, this means that they could subsequently use this precedent to build their security architecture or become involved in another system, particularly if they receive support from the United States and China in establishing security systems.

Consequently, Moscow will try to do everything possible to prevent the collapse of the CSTO, because this is not only a matter of prestige. It is particularly noteworthy that, under Article 20 of the CSTO Charter, mechanisms for terminating membership do in fact exist, and a member state can be expelled from the organization for failing to fulfill its obligations. This is an article relevant to Armenia, given that its membership status has been frozen.

The same cannot be said about the EAEU, whose charter does not contain a similar provision. However, it cannot be ruled out that the Armenian authorities also want to turn this issue into a broad subject of discussion in relations with Russia. Since Moscow views its relations with Armenia as a package, Yerevan acts in the same way.

The CSTO meeting is scheduled to take place in November, while the EAEU summit will be held in December. It cannot be ruled out that Armenia wants to clarify its part of the package of Armenian-Russian relations before then. This may be why Armenia has decided to establish a working group to discuss the Russian railway issue, as well as the future of the Armenian nuclear power plant, regarding which discussions are currently underway with various countries, including Russia.

All of this serves to demonstrate that Armenia simply wants to introduce certain final clarifications into Armenian-Russian relations, rather than take clear political steps against Russia’s interests – an issue I have had the opportunity to discuss before. Once again, it should be noted that Armenia has not yet taken any practical steps against Russia’s regional interests; it has only been employing tough rhetoric. Whether Moscow is determined to keep Armenia within its orbit or let it go will probably become clear sooner than expected.

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