Karabakh Negotiations Revisited: Can Perpetual Motion Lead Anywhere?

After the Madrid meeting in 2007, other documents were also produced at subsequent meetings in St. Petersburg and Kazan. Even the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov floated his own eponymous plan, which constitutes a derivation of the Madrid one.

The reason that there is so much persistence about the Madrid Principles is that many parts of it have been discussed and have even enjoyed acceptance by both sides. Yet, the parties remain estranged from embracing the entirety of the plan, which is the comprehensive total of its different components.

The Madrid Principles were drafted in November 2007 by the OSCE Ministerial Council. The plan’s preamble is based on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975: refraining from the use of force, the concepts of territorial integrity and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Although the last two concepts are contradictory in and of themselves, the remaining political statements are even more challenging. “The final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh will be determined through a plebiscite allowing the free and genuine expression of the people of NK.” In the meantime, the region will enjoy an “interim status.”

In return, the Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno Karabakh will be returned to Azerbaijani control, with special provisions for Kelbajar and Lachin.

Although Armenian political rhetoric excludes any territorial concessions, all successive administrations have agreed to the principle. But the question is the application of the plan, which also calls for peacekeeping forces to avoid clashes with the returning refugees.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan refuse to allow Russian peacekeepers, in deference to the West, so as not to allow another foothold for Moscow in the region. Had Armenia had agreed to Russian peacekeepers, Moscow could tilt towards Armenia but the current policy keeps the parties at loggerheads, which is also reflected on the co-chair level.

Armenia’s reluctance to bet on a future plebiscite emanates from the fear of the shrinking Armenian demographic.

Thus far, Baku has never signed off on the plan, at least publicly, only offering to the people of Karabakh the “highest level of autonomy” under Azerbaijani rule.

After the pogroms of 1905-7, 1920 and 1988, Armenians will never offer their necks willingly to the Azeri sword.

Armenia’s silent partner in refusing territorial concession to Azerbaijan is Iran. Tehran can rely on the Iranian-Armenian border as a peaceful one. Shortening that border to the benefit of Azerbaijan will impose more military tensions on Tehran, because the Aliyev dynasty has turned its country’s territory into  a proving ground for the Israeli military and a potential launchpad in case Israel decides to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, Tehran must tacitly approve any deal at which Armenia arrives with Azerbaijan, to say nothing of all other interested parties.

From all appearances, it looks like some agreement has already been achieved. Or could it be a temporary lull, due to wariness and the busy involvements of the regional forces?