Commentary: Armenia-Russia Relations — More Complex Than They Appear

The main purpose of Medvedev’s visit was to renew the treaty of the second Russian military base in Gumri through the year 2044. During his visit, he attended the unofficial gathering of the Collective Security Pact of the seven former Soviet republics, as well as dedicating the “Hill of Honor” in memory of soldiers slain in the 19th century fighting against Ottoman Turks.

This visit marked also the signing of an agreement to build a new nuclear power plant in Armenia by Russia.

The visit has a broader impact on Armenia’s future economic relations with its neighbors. In the margins of this visit, the projects of Armenia-Iran railroad and pipeline, as well as an oil refining facility in Armenia were also being discussed.

Following the August 2008 war with Georgia, Moscow is consolidating its strategic posture in the region, and the base in Armenia is only one component of Russia’s assertive policy in the region. The other components are the new Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow signed a new treaty with Ukraine about its naval forces stationed in Sevastapol on the Black Sea and it upgraded its naval forces in the Caspian Sea.

All these developments will come to dampen Turkey’s Pan-Touranian designs, which eventually may boost Iran’s strategic standing in the region, opposed by Russia, the EU and the US.

Russia intends to build a peacekeeping force, similar to NATO or the UN, to preserve stability within the territories of the seven signatories of the CIS Collective Security Pact.

Russia’s return to the “near abroad” will assign to history the Bush-Cheney policy of perpetual war and provocation, especially on Russia’s southern flanks. In light of these new developments, the Washington Post foresees the waning of US influence in the region, which does not bode well for Georgia.

Commenting on the agreement to extend Russian bases in Armenia, Alexander Khramichkin, the Moscow analyst for the Political and Strategic Institute has stated: “With this new agreement, Moscow will be able to maintain a powerful presence in the region, at no cost, while Armenia will be guaranteed against its neighbors, intending to resolve the Karabagh issue by force.”

The presidential visit and the agreements signed have triggered a hot debate among political parties, statesmen and analysts within Armenia.

The proponents of the agreements contend that Armenia has three strategic partners — Russia, the US and the European Union — yet only one can meet Armenia’s needs: Russia. The EU has no military force to extend to the region, thus relegating the task to NATO forces; and the US is unwilling, as evidenced during the Russian-Georgian conflict.

The other advantage for Armenia is cheap or free access to Russian modern military hardware, through the entire life of the treaty.

There is also debate about the command of the forces based on Armenian soil. In the event of aggression or threat of war, Armenia’s
president will assume the command by the authority vested on him in the constitution.

Of course, a 4,000-strong force may not deter any enemy from its aggressive design, but the defenders of the treaty believe the modern military technology in place will.

There are also opponents of the treaty, one of them being the political analyst Aharon Adibekian, who gives a sarcastic analogy to Armenia’s reliance on Russia. He cites the sixth paragraph of the US Army code for women, which allegedly states: “When being cornered by the enemy, do not resist, don’t get tense, just enjoy for maximum pleasure.”

He says thus Armenia cannot refuse whatever Russia asks for “it can only relax to derive maximum pleasure.”

Another opponent is Karina Danielyan, member of Public Council, who states that “Russia has always backed Armenia, but it has abandoned us at critical moments. It has betrayed us. There is validity in these opposing views.”

Some of the critics believe that the extension of the treaty will mark the demise of Armenia’s complementarism in its foreign policy. Azerbaijan and Georgia are worried that by these new initiatives the military balance is tilting towards Armenia. The Azeri press is especially very vocal in criticizing these deals and calls for Moscow to give up the role of being an even-handed mediator in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

To appease the Baku administration, Moscow is extending a carrot, which can counterbalance or neutralize the strategic advantage offered to Armenia by Russia.Moscow is proposing to sell C-300 missile systems to Azerbaijan. When interviewed on Armenian Public TV, Foreign Minister Serguey Lavrov not only has not denied the rumors, but has even confirmed the deal, justifying it as a “defensive missile system.”

Therefore, if Baku attacks Karabagh or Armenia, it is secured by the Russian arms against a possible Armenian retaliation. It is an ironic approach, which can only be understood and explained with the overall strategic Russian design in the region, marginalizing the security of the individual nations in the Caucasus.

There is some euphoria in Armenia after Mevedev’s departure, mostly derived from Armenia’s traditional confidence in Russia.
But the handwriting is on the wall. Armenia should exact maximum benefit from the modern weaponry available through this treaty to neutralize Azerbaijan’s arms build up through its petro dollars and rely on its only forces, should Russia relent in its commitment to defend Armenia.

Russia has already a fig leaf to justify an inaction, arguing that Karabagh being a non-recognized political entity, cannot be covered by the mutual treaty.

Surprises may happen any time. Armenia cannot be lulled into inaction in case of an aggression.

Let us count on Russia, but let us count even more on our own resources.