Russia is highly likely to remain a driver of geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus for the foreseeable future. The potential ceasefire in Ukraine may shift Moscow’s resources back to the South Caucasus and thus make Russia’s position stronger. The relations built since 1991 has given Russia leverage with Armenia, including the presence of Russian military base and border troops in Armenia, and Armenia’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while Armenia was providing an opportunity for Russia to project power in the South Caucasus and foment its position as the strongest external player in the region.
Over the past four years, relations between Armenia and Russia have changed significantly, transforming Moscow from a strategic ally into a problematic partner. Both sides now harbor a lengthy list of grievances against the other. With the potential new chapter in Ukraine comes also an opportunity for both countries to reset their bilateral relationship and find a new modus operandi.
According to the Armenian government, Russia has failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1997 bilateral agreement to protect Armenia during Azerbaijan’s incursions into Armenian territory in 2021 and 2022. Furthermore, Russia did not prevent Azerbaijan’s military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. Another major point of contention is Russia’s insistence on implementing Article 9 of the November 10, 2020, trilateral statement, while the remainder has been void given Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s noncompliance with it.
On the other hand, Russia accuses Armenia of “pivoting toward the West” by deepening cooperation with the European Union, France and the United States, inviting EU observers to Armenia while freezing its membership of and openly criticizing the CSTO. The signature of the US–Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter and discussions to sign a New Partnership Agenda with the EU have upset Russia.
Armenia has also drastically reduced its military-technical cooperation with Russia. Armenia sourced more than 90% of its weapons from Russia a few years ago. As of 2025, that figure has dropped to below 10%, with India and, to some extent, France emerging as Armenia’s primary partners in defense cooperation. Interestingly, Russia does not criticize Armenia’s military partnership with India, at least openly.
Despite these political and diplomatic tensions, bilateral economic ties are flourishing. In 2024, trade turnover reached $12.4 billion, from $2.5 billion in 2021. Russia remains a key destination for a significant portion of Armenia’s exports and is the primary source of several strategic imports, including wheat, while Russia is benefitting from re-export of multiple goods done via Armenia, a process started after the US and the EU imposed sanctions on Russia. The growing economic relations give Russia additional opportunities to use them as leverage against Armenia if Moscow deems this appropriate, but the re-export of billions of USD goods to Russia via Armenia also provides leverages for Yerevan.
