Tessa Hofmann: The Situation in Artsakh Corresponds to UN Genocide Convention

Find a knife, a sharp one! The Armenian is a scum! What an epic! The Jew is not alone on earth,

The foul Armenian has surpassed the Jew now.

Thank Allah, Jew, there is a second son of Shaitan,

The dirty, loathsome Armenian will go to the stake with you.”

Another example: Dissenters such as the writer Akram Aylisli face political persecution and death threats. A. Aylisli had addressed the persecution of Armenians in the past and present in his novel Stone Dreams (2012, written in 2005). The impetus for the publication of this remarkable work, which was initially withheld by Aylisli, was the triumphant reception in Baku of Ramil Safarov, who had beheaded a sleeping Armenian officer at night with an axe in Budapest and is celebrated as a national hero in his homeland.

President Ilham Aliyev then canceled Aylisli’s pension and his honorary title of “Writer of the Nation.” Aylisli’s works were removed from the curriculum, his plays may no longer be performed, and his books were publicly burned. The pro-government Müasir Müsavat Partiyası party announced that it would pay ten thousand manats (about $12,000) to anyone who cut off the writer’s ears.

Orbeli: The authorities of Artsakh and Armenia claim that Baku’s ultimate goal is to evict Armenians from Artsakh. This will mean that again a part of the Armenians will be uprooted from their ancestral lands, as in 1915. What is the place of the concept of “deprivation of the fatherland” in the crimes of genocide?

Hofmann: Azerbaijan wants Artsakh, but an Artsakh without Armenians. Whether this goal is achieved through starvation or expulsion is ultimately secondary. Loss of homeland is not listed as a criminal offense of genocide, but it is empirically present in every genocide. The survivors can no longer live in their homeland, at least not visibly as members of the genocidally annihilated group. As the example of the Republic of Turkey shows, they can exist there at best as crypto-Armenians, completely dependent on the mercy of their oppressors and deprived of any dignity and human rights.

Orbeli: What do you think, is Baku implementing its policy against Artsakh and Artsakh Armenians alone?

Hofmann: Baku is supported by Turkey; the father of the current president coined the phrase “one nation in two states,” declaring Turkey a brother nation and the protecting power of Azerbaijan. But Azerbaijan certainly also feels emboldened by the disinterest and indolence of the international community. Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and Yerevan all agree that Artsakh is an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

As for Armenia’s official Artsakh policy, it is far from the ‘Miatsum, Miatsum’ shouts of 1988. And also far from Nikol Pashinyan’s statement in 2019, “Artsakh is Armenia, and basta!” But Armenia is mistaken if it thinks to save its existence by sacrificing the remnants of Artsakh. Azerbaijan has an omnivorous appetite, even for Syunik, even for Yerevan.

More difficult to assess is the attitude of militarily weakened Russia, which is often mistakenly seen as the supposed protective power of Armenians. In its most recent statements, the Russian Foreign Ministry points out that Nikol Pashinyan has recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan since May 2023, thus rendering the agreements of the 2020 cease-fire obsolete. Russia also has no international mandate for its peacekeeping forces.

Orbeli: How can the international community help resolve this catastrophic crisis? Do you see any political mechanisms that can be implemented to prevent the commission of a new serious crime against Artsakh Armenians?

Hofmann: What we are seeing at the moment is an unfortunately very delayed reaction in some Western countries. In Great Britain, in France and in Canada, parliamentarians are calling for the blockade to be lifted. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag is also calling for this.

Moreno Ocampo’s expert opinion suggests that the United Nations Security Council refer the Lachin Corridor and the situation in Artsakh to the International Criminal Court (ICC). If this could be achieved, it is certainly helpful. Sanctions would be as well.

The Armenian diaspora and its institutions can play an important role in mobilizing decision-makers. If they want to.

It seems to me of particular importance that we succeed in changing the internationally widespread narrative: The conflict in and around Artsakh does not originate from a territorial conflict between the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It arises from the oppression of a region that was arbitrarily annexed to Soviet Azerbaijan against the will of its people at the beginning of Soviet rule. Legally, it is a conflict between the right to national self-determination and the principle of sovereignty, although post-Soviet Azerbaijan’s claim to Artsakh is legally questionable anyway. Moreover, in the conflict between self-determination and sovereignty, the former takes precedence.