Russian-Armenian Relations Enter New Phase

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Russian-Armenian relations have entered a rather interesting phase. On the one hand, there are no major contentious issues in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. On the other hand, external factors have created challenges that affect their bilateral ties.

In other words, these challenges stem primarily from Armenia’s relations with the West, which, in turn, influence Armenia’s relationship with Russia. Viewed in this context, it becomes clear that issues directly related to bilateral relations can generally be resolved through working-level discussions. However, when the discussion shifts to Armenia’s broader foreign policy, disagreements begin to emerge.

A few days ago, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin held a telephone conversation. According to official statements, they discussed the agenda of Armenia-Russia cooperation, including trade and economic relations, science and technology, and cultural and humanitarian cooperation. It is noteworthy that the phone call was initiated by the Armenian side.

At the same time, several Armenian media outlets reported that Prime Minister Pashinyan had initially sought to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin but was unable to do so. In reality, from Armenia’s perspective, both the Russian president and the prime minister can be considered counterparts to the Armenian prime minister. Pashinyan regularly meets with both of them, participating in intergovernmental events with Mishustin and in meetings of heads of state with Putin.

Judging by the official readout, the conversation with the Russian prime minister focused exclusively on economic, trade, and practical cooperation rather than political issues. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the remaining political matters will be discussed with President Putin at a later stage.

Another notable point is that President Putin has not yet congratulated his Armenian counterpart on the victory in the recent parliamentary elections. Of course, no congratulatory message has been issued so far, and the most likely explanation is the ongoing proceedings before Armenia’s Constitutional Court and the fact that the final election results have not yet been officially confirmed. Moreover, it is generally not customary to congratulate a leader merely on winning parliamentary elections; such congratulations are usually extended after the individual is officially elected or appointed prime minister.

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Nevertheless, the discussion of the aforementioned topics with the Russian prime minister demonstrates that dialogue between the two countries continues. In fact, it is Armenia that is taking the initiative to maintain this dialogue, while simultaneously emphasizing at various levels that relations with Russia remain a foreign policy priority and that Armenia has no intention of leaving the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

This gives the impression that these statements are intended as assurances of goodwill toward Russia, aimed at easing tensions. The Armenian government appears to recognize that Moscow has grown increasingly uneasy over Yerevan’s expanding ties with the West.

Russia undoubtedly expects loyalty from Armenia. However, it is equally evident that Moscow no longer possesses the same degree of leverage and coercive influence over Armenia that it once did. As a result, Russia understands that Armenia could, at least in theory, gradually move out of its sphere of influence and deepen its integration with the United States or the European Union.

It is equally clear that Armenia’s leadership does not wish to find itself in a situation where it is forced to choose between Russia and the West. Avoiding such a binary choice remains one of the key objectives of Armenia’s current foreign policy.

The Armenian leadership recognizes that having a country like Russia as an outright adversary would be highly detrimental to Armenia’s national interests. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the government will do everything possible to reduce the current tensions in bilateral relations.

As for the West, Armenia is most likely neither being considered nor is it likely ever to be considered a candidate for European Union membership. However, amid the deepening confrontation between Russia and the West, there appears to be an expectation that Armenia will increasingly align itself with the Western bloc by integrating as closely as possible without formal membership, while simultaneously withdrawing from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and developing privileged relations with Western partners outside the framework of EU accession.

Such a scenario would not serve Armenia’s national interests. It would leave the country in a strategically difficult position, severing its ties with Russia while at the same time failing to become a full-fledged member of the European political and economic community.

It is a fact that Armenia has traditionally pursued a foreign policy based on balancing its relations with both Russia and the West. The objective has been to avoid becoming entangled in their geopolitical rivalry, thereby minimizing the risk of being forced to choose one side over the other or provoking tensions with either partner.

Under the current government, however, Armenia has increasingly found itself at the center of these geopolitical contradictions. This has visibly irritated one side, while Armenia has not secured meaningful economic, political, or security guarantees from the other. From a strategic perspective, Armenia would arguably have been better served by maintaining a more neutral position and minimizing its involvement in highly sensitive issues until tensions between Russia and the West begin to ease.

Such a cautious approach might have made it more difficult for the current government to secure political re-election. Without leveraging these geopolitical tensions in the domestic political arena, and without framing the elections as a choice between a Western-oriented future and a Russian-oriented one, it is unlikely that the government would have received the level of direct political support from Western partners that accompanied the electoral process.

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