Yerevan Threatens to Leave Russia-led Blocs in Latest Diplomatic Row with Moscow

“The price of gas in Europe exceeds $600 per 1000 cubic meters, and Russia sells gas to Armenia for $177.5 per 1000 cubic meters,” Putin said.

Similarly to Simonyan, Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan expressed confidence that gas prices would not change, because “Armenia is needed by its partners so that it remains both in the CSTO and in the EAEU.”

“If Armenia is not supposed to receive those benefits, then why should it remain in that union? A process of joining another union will begin, and it will happen in a more accelerated manner,” Papoyan said.

He also questioned the benefits the CSTO provided to Armenia, at the same time highlighting Armenia’s value as a member, serving as a passage for goods to the bloc.

Following Armenian official statements, on Monday, Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka suggested that CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov visit Armenia to speak with Pashinyan and “learn their position on the future” regarding Armenia’s membership.

Armenia had “frozen” its membership in the CSTO in February 2024, citing its refusal to aid Armenia in the face of Azerbaijani attacks in 2021 and 2022.

However, Armenian officials, including Pashinyan, appear to be more inclined towards leaving the CSTO, rather than “unfreezing” Armenia’s membership. In an interview with RFE/RL last Friday, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan stated that Armenia was “practically out of the CSTO.”

“I do not see any possibility that Armenia will return, and the remaining steps should be taken when necessary and at the appropriate time,” Kostanyan said.

Armenia appears to reject Russia’s aid to tackle hybrid threats

In the same interview, Kostanyan also responded to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, who recently expressed Moscow’s readiness to assist Armenia in tackling hybrid attacks, citing its resources and capabilities.

“Russia has other resources too, the same ‘Matroshka’ and ‘storm’ networks. We would be happy to receive information from them, for example, how these Telegram bots connected to them work,” Kostanyan said.

The two bot networks, affiliated with Russia, were launched in 2023. Records indicate they have been active in Armenia, Moldova, France, Germany, and other countries.

Kostanyan further accused Russia of often being more interested in the continuation of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict rather than finding a resolution to it.

“It has shown over the years that it is often more interested in the existence of conflict than in the presence of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Kostanyan said.

Zakharova’s statement followed remarks by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in March.

Responding to a question about the possibility of requesting similar support from Russia to tackle hybrid attacks, as they did from the EU, Mirzoyan noted: “If Russia has its own experience in combating hybrid attacks and is ready to share it, we are not against it. Let them share it, and we will see what kind of experience it is.”

On Monday, April 6, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry responded to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s recent comments where he said “the question of Karabakh’s ownership is in no way related to Russia; that decision rests with the Armenian authorities.” Peskov had made the remark following Putin’s meeting with Pashinyan.

Baku noted that “no country, including Russia, […] has ever questioned the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh region.” It also urged that “issues related to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty will not become a subject of public clarification at a time when Russian–Armenian relations are complex.”

Addressing Armenia’s frozen status in CSTO, Putin repeated previously debunked claims in the meeting, insisting that following Pashinyan’s government’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague in October 2022, “the CSTO’s intervention in this process […] was simply absolutely wrong in this matter.”

Armenia had only appealed for CSTO assistance following the Azerbaijani attack on Armenia in September 2022. In his response during the meeting with Putin, Pashinyan insisted that in 2022, “CSTO mechanisms should have been activated, but they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO.”

He also said that before Armenia’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, “the top leadership of Russia […] twice publicly announced this.”

(This story originally appeared on www.oc-media.org on April 6.)