Why Did Pashinyan Head to Moscow?

479
0

On April 1, negotiations took place between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, who visited Moscow on a working trip. The meeting followed upon a press release distributed by the Kremlin.

The talks covered the current state and prospects of Russian-Armenian relations within the framework of strategic partnership and alliance, integration cooperation in the Eurasian space, and topical issues on the regional agenda—particularly the development of economic and transport-logistics ties in the South Caucasus.

Pashinyan had previously stated that he understands the nature of Russia and other great powers and actively seeks meetings with them. This suggested that the meeting was largely initiated by the Armenian side. The issues discussed were significant, covering a range of topics addressed in my earlier analyses.

First, the Russian side placed the current state of bilateral strategic relations on the agenda, signaling that Armenia was expected to reaffirm its commitment to relations with Moscow. The second major point concerned Eurasian integration processes, primarily within the Eurasian Economic Union. The discussions indicated that Armenia was unlikely to leave the union and move toward EU integration, as sometimes portrayed by Armenia’s authorities, but might instead deepen its engagement within Eurasian frameworks and institutions.

Logistics issues in the South Caucasus were addressed, particularly regarding the Russian railway, part of which Armenia hopes to privatize for use in the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project. Discussions about the relevant section of the Armenian railway had been ongoing for some time. Because it is part of the Russian railway system, separating a segment is complicated both logistically and geopolitically. Pashinyan likely attempted to secure Russian agreement in Moscow, though it remained difficult to imagine Russia consenting without ensuring its own interests. Russia had also repeatedly stated that it could participate in the TRIPP project and maintain a presence throughout the logistics chain.

Russia has not abandoned the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020, which addresses logistical and transport connectivity issues. This meant Russia approached the discussion with its own calculations, especially given the challenges created by the US-led war against Iran over the past month, which increased regional risks associated with implementing the TRIPP project.

Get the Mirror in your inbox:

All three directions highlighted in the Russian press release represented critical and comprehensive topics requiring discussion at the highest level. The Russian side may also have sought clarification regarding the so-called “hybrid war” it is allegedly conducting against Armenia — a claim frequently made by Armenian authorities — which could have become part of the discussion. Likewise, Russia likely outlined its own interests and priorities to the Armenian leadership.

While the range of issues at such meetings is always broad, the recent phone conversation between the Russian and Armenian leaders likely served as the occasion for Pashinyan to request the meeting and specify the issues he wanted to discuss. These priorities subsequently appeared in the Russian press release.

There were also other important circumstances. Due to developments surrounding Iran, Russia and the war in Ukraine had somewhat moved to the background, and in the United States, the war in Ukraine was no longer the central topic of public attention. Instead, focus shifted to the conflict involving the United States and Israel against Iran.

As a result, and also considering the reduction of aid to Ukraine, including military assistance, Russia gained a certain opportunity to become more active, including in the South Caucasus. Taking into account that US involvement in the TRIPP project could encounter obstacles, and that Iran might view TRIPP as a threat, Russia likely aimed to take advantage of this moment to advance its national interests.

Finally, Pashinyan’s visit also had a pre-election dimension. His team, preparing for upcoming elections, could not present to the Armenian public that relations with Russia were strained, as this would call into question his foreign policy and diplomatic capabilities — a situation the current authorities were unlikely to allow. The elections itself was also discussed with Putin, as mentioned in the press release following the meeting.

Of course, in addition to all these topics, the leaders of Armenia and Russia also discussed a number of other important issues, the key one being the disagreements surrounding the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). During the public part of their meeting, both sides presented their positions regarding the CSTO. During the meeting in Kremlin the Armenian side attempted to place the responsibility for Armenia’s problems with the CSTO on Russia, while the Russian side, in turn, tried to shift that responsibility onto Armenia, stating that the CSTO’s position was conditioned by Armenia’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, particularly the fact that Armenia recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

It is true that there are many accumulated issues and problems in Armenian-Russian relations. However, this does not mean that Armenia is trying at all costs to break away from Russia and distance itself. Moreover, Armenia has not taken any concrete anti-Russian steps so far, aside from statements, calls, and discussions.

Get the Mirror-Spectator Weekly in your inbox: