What Comes Next in Iran?

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The beginning of the war against Iran had been anticipated days earlier, when the United States was amassing troops throughout the Middle East and preparing for military operations. Today, it is difficult to say how events will unfold and to what extent the US will be able, within a short period of time, to achieve its main objectives: a complete change of power in Iran and the final elimination of its nuclear and missile programs.

This process could last weeks. However, if Washington concludes that a change of government is not achievable — because the Iranian population does not take to the streets — then it may declare “victory” prematurely and withdraw from the region without achieving a full transfer of authority in Iran. If the US fails to reach this objective, the war could be considered pointless, as the primary target would remain unmet.

The Trump administration has not succeeded in securing broad domestic political support, since this war is not popular among the public, and neither is President Donald Trump himself. According to polls, approximately 27% of Americans approve of the joint US-Israeli strikes against Iran. Within the Republican Party, support reaches only around 40%. At the same time, only about 43% of Americans hold a favorable view of Donald Trump. These are relatively weak indicators for a sitting administration.

It is worth recalling that after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, George W. Bush’s approval rating exceeded 90%, and he had strong support from both Congress and the public for the invasion of Afghanistan.

Against the backdrop of potential casualties and losses of military equipment, Trump’s approval rating could decline even further, which would complicate the Republicans’ position in the November 2026 midterm elections. In this context, the prospect of impeachment in the United States could also become somewhat realistic — following a scenario similar to how Armenia’s opposition envisions political pressure: through public pressure, persuading certain Republicans to join Democrats in initiating impeachment proceedings against Trump. Therefore, a prolonged and large-scale war is absolutely not in Trump’s interest; he needs to demonstrate quick results and bring the troops home.

As for the regional situation, tensions in the Middle East are high, but in the South Caucasus there are currently no significant escalations. This is largely because there have not yet been large-scale refugee flows that could create challenges for Armenia and other countries. In Iran itself, a fragmentation process has not taken shape so far, and the population is not taking to the streets en masse to carry out a revolution.

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For Armenia, the worst-case scenario would be the fragmentation of Iran and the creation of separate states within its territory. However, I consider this prospect unlikely. Although Iran could theoretically be drawn into a civil war, at this moment there are no clear signs pointing in that direction.

If a civil war does not break out in Iran and the country does not fragment, then, most likely, all sides will declare “victory,” attempting to present the outcome of their actions as a success to their respective domestic audiences. In such situations, informational and political outcomes often become no less important than military ones.

I would emphasize again: if internal collapse or large-scale instability does not occur in Iran, the direct and significant impact on Armenia will likely be limited. Of course, indirect economic or energy-related consequences are possible, but they would most likely be manageable.

As for the post-war phase, the situation could become more tense. A key question is to what extent Iran will tolerate the implementation of projects or security rearrangements in its immediate neighborhood that could be perceived as threats to its interests like a TRIPP. However, at this point, the prospect of Iran’s fragmentation or the collapse of its Islamic system does not appear realistic.

At the same time, Trump’s political time is limited. He needs visible and rapid results, both for his domestic audience and in the context of electoral processes. If such results are not clear and tangible, the military initiative could turn into a domestic political burden. Overall, the situation remains fluid and unpredictable, and definitive assessments will only be possible once it becomes clear whether internal processes in Iran will deepen or not.

Topics: Geopolitics, war
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