For many years in Armenia – decades, actually – there has been a debate about whether it is possible to integrate into the European Union or become a member of NATO. Armenia’s relations with NATO and the EU have generally developed quite positively.
Before the change of power in 2018, this issue was not part of Armenia’s foreign policy agenda. The justification for its absence was that Armenia was not particularly expected to join the EU. It did not share a common border with the EU and was a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). After the change of regime, however, the environment changed significantly, and the authorities of Armenia began to look toward Europe, hoping that Europe, in turn, would one day look toward Armenia and that such integration might become possible. This would be a very complex process.
We should not forget that Georgia, Ukraine, and a number of other states have traversed a very long and difficult path but have still not managed to become EU members, largely because of Russia’s fundamental opposition. Russia has viewed European integration as potential NATO membership and has consistently opposed the expansion of NATO’s borders toward its own. The Russian–Georgian and Russian–Ukrainian wars, tensions, and complexities in relations stem from this. These examples have often been cited in Armenia by opponents to integration attempts, who explain that if Armenia chooses this path, problems may arise in its relations with Russia.
Russia’s policy in this regard is quite revealing. In the case of Georgia, it separated Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia and created a kind of buffer zone for itself so that if Georgia were to one day become an EU/NATO member, Russia would not share a larger and longer border with Georgia and there would be a buffer zone between NATO and Russia. The same applies to Ukraine: Russia seeks create a buffer zone between Luhansk and Donetsk and the rest of Ukraine so that, in any scenario, NATO and Russian borders would not touch. Belarus also serves as such a buffer state for Russia. It is noteworthy that the total land border between the world’s largest country and the world’s largest military bloc amounts to only about 2,600 km., which is extremely small given the size of Russia and the NATO countries. This calculation includes the border with Finland, which became a NATO member only in 2023.
But, unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Armenia does not share a common border with Russia. From this perspective, Armenia’s potential EU/NATO membership cannot be seen as a direct threat to Russia. However, Russia views Armenia as part of its historical sphere of influence and considers that its influence in the South Caucasus must be fully restored. This is especially true since as a result of the 2020 war, Russia lost much of its influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and its relations with Georgia remain strained.
Therefore, Russia will view Armenia’s possible European integration not as a direct threat, but rather a problem from the perspective of its regaining influence in the South Caucasus. Russia could strengthen its influence in the region if it manages to keep at least two of the three South Caucasus states within its orbit. However, today both Azerbaijan and Armenia have almost completely broken free from Russia’s historical influence, and Georgia, despite some warming in relations, continues to maintain a significant distance from Moscow.
