As Azerbaijan and Armenia Reset Relations, Baku Looks to the Middle East

Baku Doubles Down on Israel

Ties between Israel and Azerbaijan are nothing new. Both states have long nurtured a relationship, marked by mutual concerns around Iranian influence, Azerbaijani oil flowing toward Israel, and Israeli weapons making their way to Azerbaijan.

Turkey’s strong opposition to Israel amid Jerusalem’s destructive campaign in Gaza has complicated Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel, but by no means deterred it. In fact, as Syrian ties have grown over the course of the last year, so too have Israeli relations taken on new and ambitious forms.

In terms of energy, February 2025 saw SOCAR’s first purchases in Israel’s Mediterranean gas fields, placing physical SOCAR assets within Israeli maritime territory for the first time.

Turkish pressure did drive Azerbaijan to remove Israel from customs records of energy shipments in 2025. But Israeli government sources reported to Haaretz that they had “received a promise from the Azerbaijanis that the strategic relations will continue, including in the energy sector.” Azerbaijani oil has continued to reach Israel by way of intermediary parties — including other state-owned Azerbaijani firms.

On a political level, this year has seen a concerted effort by Azerbaijan, Israel and advocates for both countries in the US, in promoting the concept of a trilateral security partnership between Baku, Jerusalem and Donald Trump’s Washington. The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed speculation around such efforts in March, saying it is in discussions “to establish a strong foundation for trilateral cooperation between Israel, Azerbaijan, and the US.” Articles across American and Israeli media, often written by pro-Israel or pro-Azerbaijan commentators, now regularly advocate for the inclusion of Azerbaijan in an expanded Abraham Accords — despite Azerbaijan having recognized Israel since independence.

“Azerbaijan has been involved in the Middle East for some time,” Joseph Epstein, head of the Turan Research Centre, told OC Media.

From Epstein’s view, Azerbaijan’s interest in the Middle East has grown substantially since 2020, saying that “Baku has increased cooperation with the Gulf and has been particularly active in Syria.”

Speaking of Azerbaijan’s regional approach, Epstein argued that while “the motivations differ by country, there is a clear overall trend: Baku is positioning itself as a trusted regional mediator.”

Yet, this year’s events have likewise demonstrated the apparent limits of the Azerbaijan–Israel partnership. This was most clear in June, when Israel engaged in a 12 day air campaign against Iranian nuclear, military, and government targets — a period of time that saw Azerbaijan urge de-escalation and caution, especially in Iran’s ethnically Azerbaijani region of Tabriz, which saw substantial Israeli bombardment.

Promising Partners in the Gulf

Yet a third axis of Azerbaijani relations with the Middle East is between Baku and the energy-rich monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These countries, which have seen an explosion of wealth in recent decades due to energy exports, are now actively partnering with Baku in numerous sectors. Qatar, alongside Turkey, financially backed the pipeline now bringing Azerbaijan’s gas to Syria. With Baku developing domestic renewable energy, the UAE’s Masdar and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power firms have built out major roles in Azerbaijan, building the country’s largest solar and wind energy farms respectively.

Ties appear particularly strong with the UAE. This summer, Aliyev struck a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Emirati leader Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on the sidelines of Emirati-hosted peace talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in the run up to this summer’s Washington summit. Authorities touted the CEPA as opening opportunities for more direct Emirati investment in Azerbaijani energy and logistics, building on the reported 36-percent growth in bilateral trade in 2024.

While it may seem that the core of the relationship between the GCC countries and Azerbaijan is economic, Aliyev and Sheikh Mohamed have made little secret of hopes for broader political cooperation. Sheikh Mohamed made an official visit to Baku in 2024, the first ever visit of a UAE head of state to Azerbaijan, with the two signing a strategic cooperation agreement. Following the signing of that agreement, Aliyev addressed Sheikh Mohamed, saying “under your leadership, your country has attained remarkable success, establishing itself as one of the most developed and successful nations in the world. I know that your successful experience serves as an example for many countries.”

This comment from Aliyev illustrates a broader idea potentially undergirding Azerbaijani–Gulf ties. For Azerbaijan, a hydrocarbon-rich and highly authoritarian state, the GCC countries likely offer a highly appealing development model. These small states have become incredibly prosperous, internationally influential, and open to global businesses, and have done so without compromising closed political systems or socially conservative values. Such a program likely strikes a chord with Baku, where the authorities have worked in recent decades to build hyper-modern buildings and attractions in Baku reminiscent of Dubai or Abu Dhabi.

Sheikh Mohamed made a second visit to Azerbaijan just this September, where both he and Aliyev underscored their interest in upgraded relations. Perhaps alluding to a more politically inflected relationship, the trip brought Sheikh Mohamed not only to Baku, but to the symbolically central city of Shusha (Sushi), recaptured by Azerbaijani forces in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. In the ensuing lavish coverage in Azerbaijani government media, one commentator described Azerbaijan as “the new magnet of the Persian Gulf” and wrote of the “personal and trusting communication between President Ilham Aliyev and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed” and “the special spiritual closeness of the two leaders.”

During his recent Al Arabiya interview, Aliyev remarked that “for 17 years since I assumed office, until we liberated [Nagorno-Karabakh], that issue was number one, number two, and number ten.” The statement, perhaps somewhat overstated, nevertheless does communicate the dominating nature the conflict with Armenia had over Baku’s policy.

Now, however, Azerbaijan is roughly two years on from a total victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, an event that likely resulted in freeing up political imaginations and simultaneously created the sense in Baku of having arrived as a rising regional power in its own right.

“The resolution of the [Nagorno-Karabakh] conflict has freed political and diplomatic bandwidth for Baku,” Epstein said. “Azerbaijan is now seeking to shift from a singular focus on territorial recovery to a broader foreign-policy agenda.”

Fuad Shahbazov, a Baku-based analyst, roughly concurred with Epstein’s appraisal.

“Azerbaijan is moving beyond its traditional reliance on Turkey and Israel by positioning itself as an energy and connectivity hub,” Shahbazov told OC Media. “With Russian peacekeepers gone and a peace treaty with Armenia within reach, Baku can shift its focus outward” and is an “increasingly relevant partner for the Middle East even without projecting military power.”

At the same time, the Middle East itself has drastically changed in a manner that is conducive to Azerbaijani influence. The steadfast alliance with Turkey now opens doors to participation in Syria with a newly pro-Turkish government in Damascus. To the south of Syria, Israeli relations have deepened in regards to energy and international political coordination. Even as Turkish–Israeli relations have disintegrated in the wake of Gaza’s destruction, Azerbaijan appears to risk neither relationship by maintaining ties with both states and is even granted new diplomatic influence as a broker between the two. In the Gulf, the dramatic growth in wealth and political influence has granted greater potential to any and all cooperation between the GCC and Baku while providing a seemingly appealing model for political and economic organization.

Baku’s diplomatic advances are the most novel in the Arab world, but are not limited to it. Azerbaijan, traditionally embroiled in its own direct neighborhood of the South Caucasus, is now a player in the Middle East in terms of energy, economy, and politics.

(Nicholas Castillo is a graduate student pursuing an MA in regional studies for Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia at Harvard University’s Davis Centre. His primary research areas include the politics and security of Eastern Europe and Caucasus and the politics of identity, ethnic conflict, and authoritarianism. His work has appeared in a variety of publications, and he is a managing editor and contributing writer for the Substack Eastern Neighborhood Bulletin. This analysis originally appeared on www.oc-media.org on September 29)