How Armenia Might Respond To Azerbaijan’s JF-17 Fighter Acquisition

“Despite signing a peace deal in March 2025 designed to resolve their decades-long conflict, Azerbaijan is requiring Armenia to make contentious constitutional changes that are delaying the agreement’s official signing and implementation,” he added. “This delay, which is likely to persist until after Armenia holds general elections in 2026, leaves the door open to another military escalation as Baku grows impatient with Yerevan and calculates that it will engender little to no blowback from the West, Russia or other key external powers.”

In contrast to sweeping Azerbaijani claims over sovereign Armenian territory, a full-scale invasion of Armenia still seems unlikely. Nevertheless, there could be more ground incursions and border clashes, especially if Baku seeks to link up with its western Nakhchivan exclave by establishing its self-styled Zangezur corridor overland through Armenia’s southernmost Syunik frontier province.

“With the threat of another conflict still on the table, Armenia is likely to leverage its growing defense partnerships with France, India and Iran – alongside an ongoing attempt to reduce tensions with Russia – to try to mitigate against Azerbaijan’s military dominance,” Lichtenstein said.

Armenia long relied heavily on Russia for discounted military hardware. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 94% of Armenia’s arms imports between 2011 and 2020 came from Russia. That drastically changed after Armenia suffered a disastrous defeat in the 2020 war. Yerevan has since sought to diversify its defense sources, reducing arms imports from Russia to as low as 10 percent by 2024.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly blamed the Ukraine war for delays in supplying Russian armaments to Armenia in recent years but still scrutinized Yerevan’s growing defense ties with France, saying “it does raise questions,” according to The Moscow Times. Meanwhile, France recently sold Armenia Caesar self-propelled howitzers, a deal that both Azerbaijan and Russia criticized.

It’s unclear if Armenia will ultimately turn to France for multirole Dassault Rafale fighter jets to match Azerbaijan’s JF-17 procurement, especially given the prohibitive price tag for Yerevan, which invariably has significantly less to spend on armaments than its oil-rich rival.

“While Yerevan will likely pursue multiple lines of effort, it is likely to focus on acquiring India-built Su-30MKIs given that they are far more cost-effective than French Rafales,” Lichtenstein said. “Moreover, while much is still unclear about last month’s confrontation between India and Pakistan, accusations that India’s fleet of Rafales did not perform as strongly could also affect Armenia’s calculus.”

India builds the unique Su-30MKI variant of the Russian combat aircraft under license. It may soon export some of these aircraft and doubtlessly sees Armenia as a potential customer. Yerevan has already made record-breaking deals for Indian-made weaponry since the start of this decade. Furthermore, as previously outlined in this space, New Delhi is the ideal candidate for upgrading Armenia’s existing Su-30SMs and making them compatible with various Indian-made munitions and weapons.

“India would likely also be interested in supplying these systems to counteract Azerbaijan’s acquisition of fighters from Pakistan, India’s arch-rival,” Lichtenstein said.

“Separate from acquiring new fighters to try to compete with Azerbaijan in the air, Armenia is also likely seeking to upgrade its air defenses with systems from India, Iran and/or others.”

(Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist focused on Middle East affairs. This analysis originally appeared on Forbes.com on June 8.)