Modern Iranian-Armenian Relations

The Purposes of Their Policy

The purposes of their policy can be formulated as follows. First, they wish to seize Syunik province of Armenia and take possession of the so-called Zangezur corridor (Meghri Pass) to connect tmainland Azerbaijan with its hinterland of Nakhijevan (and then Turkey). Syunik province is a 30-40 km strip of land that separates Azerbaijan from Nakhidjevan and Turkey.

Second, they wish to place the control of the so-called Zangezur corridor, i.e. the “middle energy route” at the disposal of Russia. The current energy routes in the area include the Nabucco route of Azerbaijan-Georgia-Türkiye and the Aras route of Azerbaijan-Iran-Turkey. The middle route of Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey, would be the shortest, smoothest and most economical route.

Russia and Turkey pursue the above goals through the Republic of Azerbaijan by encouraging and lending political, diplomatic and sometimes military support to it.

Russia does not have a common border with Armenia, so a direct Russian attack on Armenia is not possible. Regarding Turkey and its policy towards Armenia, two realities should be kept in mind. First, Turkey is facing serious economic problems, partly as a result of the terrible earthquake that occurred in 2023, and thus needs Western help. Second, the possible exit or withdrawal of United States from NATO has caused serious concern in Turkey, so that the country is now trying to gain another reliable shelter and at least gain entry into the European Union. The above factors have caused this country to refrain from the thought of an aggression against Armenia, as it would impose such high costs on it that would outweigh possible benefits. Therefore, the greatest danger that directly threatens the existence of Armenia comes now from the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The fall of Syunik, the southern province of Armenia, would actually be the beginning of the fall of the Armenian state and a disaster equal to the Genocide. In addition, the severance of Iran’s ties with the South Caucasus, the loss of its strategic depth by being encircled by the Turkic-speaking countries, will also be one of the consequences of such an event for Iran. Therefore, after the grave mistakes it made in its policy towards its two northwestern neighbours (Azerbaijan and Armenia) at the beginning of the 44-day war, the Islamic Republic has now turned to another policy for maintaining its weight and status in the South Caucasus. This approach implies the preservation of internationally recognized borders, including those of Armenia. We will return to this issue shortly.

Armenia’s Cards

What deterrents and resources does Armenia have against her existential security risks?

It is an independent state and is a member of the United Nations (at the time of the Genocide, there was no independent Armenian state)

It has a diaspora larger than the country’s population, largely created by the Genocide.

It has a democratic system based on free elections and respect for human rights.

It has close relations with the European Union and the United States (collectively, the “West”).

It has good relations with its historical neighbour Iran.

Iran’s policy towards the So-called Zangezur Corridor Issue

After the 44-day war, during which the Islamic Republic took a position to the detriment of Armenia and in favour of Azerbaijan, Iran’s policy towards its two northwestern neighbours changed. At present, Iran doesn’t want Armenia to be too weak to resist further aggression from Baku. On the other hand, the West also has started to provide assistance and support to Armenia which includes political, diplomatic, military and financial spheres.

Recently, the Armenian and Iranian governments conducted “joint” military exercises on both sides of the border, the clear purpose of which was to send a message to the Baku regime not to undertake new adventures. The combat forces of the two countries simultaneously carried out military manoeuvres and movements within their own territory and along their borders. It is said that these exercises were carried out with the knowledge and tacit approval of the European Union.

Recently, President Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran visited Baku with a large economic delegation. While meeting Azerbaijani officials including President Ilham Aliyev, he reiterated Iran’s position in support of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Armenia and on the unacceptability of changes to the internationally recognized borders.

One thing is clearly noticeable: both Iran and the West have a tacit understanding not to leave Armenia alone in face of any possible aggression from Azerbaijan.

Negotiations between Iran and the US

These negotiations, and how they will conclude, will be of vital importance not only for Iran, but especially for Armenia. It would be of importance in fact for the entire region and the world. For Armenia, it will be important in the sense that Azerbaijan will lose its playing card in the event of a possible attack by the US and Israel on Iran. In fact, the fruitfulness of the negotiations will mean a decrease in the likelihood of war in the region and a decrease in the strategic importance of Baku for the West. On the contrary, the failure of the negotiations and an increase in the likelihood of war will disrupt the relative stability of the region and will allow Baku to launch new attacks against Armenia, taking advantage of the preoccupation of Iran and the West with other matters.

From the perspective of the Baku regime, signing a peace treaty with Armenia will give the latter the opportunity to restore its economy and army in a short time and neutralize Baku’s military-economic-political superiority. Therefore, this country is constantly thinking about striking at its western neighbor and further weakening its military-economic strength.

Possible Outcomes of Negotiations

One: The talks fail.

The negotiations reach a deadlock, the parties leave the negotiating table, and military action is on the agenda. This is the worst-case scenario that can result from the talks for all parties (and for Armenia as well). In this case, the entire region, and possibly the world, will be plunged into an Armageddon with long-term terrible disasters.

Two: The talks drag on and the parties (intentionally) stall without achieving tangible results.

In the two cases above, Armenia should act with full vigilance and, if possible, take the initiative at the right time. Given that Armenia has good relations with both the Islamic Republic and the United States, it can do its part to prevent the talks from failing definitively and, as a country where the interests of the parties intersect, step forward, encourage and even persuade them to continue the talks on its soil.

Three: The negotiations produce results.

The parties reach some kind of understanding and (long-term) agreement. The world breathes a sigh of relief, the door to trade with the West opens (even if initially with some restrictions). At the same time, sanctions are lifted from Iran, Armenia has a free hand in military cooperation with Iran and possibly the conclusion of a strategic agreement with it. With continued stability in the region, the communication lines are opened after many decades, the economic-military blockade of Armenia is lifted and the entire strategic setting of the region changes providing a long-term stability and opportunity for peaceful coexistence for the peoples of the region.

(The author Arsen Nazarian, a translator, researcher and activist, lives in The Hague, Netherlands. This article is a lightly edited translation of its Persian version published on May 1 in the London publication Kayhan, https://kayhan.london/1404/02/10/375721/.)