After the teleconference between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump and the historic meeting of Russian and US delegations in Saudi Arabia, Turkey initiated another round of negotiations, inviting Russians and Americans to its own soil. Turkey has long been seen as a nation with strong ties to the US, Russia and Ukraine and as a potential mediator in the Ukraine conflict. However, Washington and Moscow opted for Saudi Arabia, leaving Turkey feeling excluded from the process that is shaping a new world order.
Turkey aspires to be a superpower not just regionally but globally. Simultaneously, Turkey aims to be a key partner for both Russia and the US. Amidst their rivalry, Turkey’s importance grows for both superpowers. However, with no tensions between them, Ankara’s influence on global and regional issues remains limited, as Russia and the US engage directly and reach agreements on certain matters. To attain its desired status, Ankara seeks greater involvement in international affairs and more leverage in important negotiations.
Its foreign policy prioritizes military involvement and an active presence in various conflicts and countries. Turkey exerts significant influence over the Syrian and Azerbaijani governments. Its participation in the Syrian and Nagorno-Karabakh wars strengthened its presence in the South Caucasus and Middle East, making it a crucial partner for both Russia and the US in their regional interests. Since the onset of the Ukraine war, Turkey has maintained friendly relations with both Kiev and Moscow, gradually supporting anti-Russian sanctions while assisting Moscow in circumventing some of them.
Despite these circumstances, one thing is clear: Turkey and Russia have been rival states for centuries, including in the South Caucasus, and their competition will remain constant. As a result, it is clear that after the Ukraine war, Russia will allocate more resources to regions where it historically held influence. A key area for Moscow in the South Caucasus is impacted by Turkey’s increased political pressure on Armenia and its historic ally, Azerbaijan.
As US-Russia relations improve and the Ukraine conflict concludes, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s importance to Russia is likely to diminish, leading to significant political changes in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s role for Russia will wane, as Moscow has depended on it for exporting its own natural resources to European nations through Azerbaijani pipelines. Europeans are aware of it but have no choice but to pay a higher price for gas that is originally Russian but comes via Azerbaijani pipelines.
After the war, once anti-Russian sanctions are lifted, some European countries will buy Russian resources directly from Moscow, making them cheaper for their populations. The same will be true for Turkey, which took advantage of US-Russia tensions to emphasize its strategic importance for both sides. However, the stabilization of US-Russia relations reduces Ankara’s significance for both powers. The choice of Saudi Arabia, rather than Turkey, as the mediator in high-level negotiations clearly indicated this shift, despite Ankara’s overt desire to play a role in the process and its frustration over losing influence. Moreover, if Trump meets Putin in Saudi Arabia as originally planned, Turkey’s role as a potential mediator between the two superpowers will diminish.
