Spinning Wheels in Sochi

Coming back to Russia’s jealous initiative, we should also analyze another factor. Although Russian and Iranian interests coincide on some issues, this time around, Tehran’s offer seemed more tantalizing, and it impacts Russia’s concerns. Indeed, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Syunik on the occasion of the opening of the Iranian consulate in Kapan. During the inauguration, he stated that “Armenia’s security is Iran’s security.”

Before arriving in Kapan, he had reiterated President Ebrahim Raisi’s and spiritual leader Ali Khamanei’s statement that any border change in the region is a red line for Iran. These statements were preceded by war games on the Iranian-Azerbaijani border.

Iran’s position was motivated by two factors. First, the visits of Turkey’s and Israel’s defense ministers, in addition to that of the Saudi Arabian foreign minister, to Azerbaijan, obviously plotting against Tehran. The other factor was the arrival of European observers to the region, who may also have as part of their intentions to peek through the Iranian border.

At the conclusion of the Sochi summit, the parties did not issue any individual statements. Instead, a joint communique was released, rehashing all the earlier statements and rhetoric. The communique calls for Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to comply with the agreements of November 9, 2020, January 11 and November 26, 2021.

The statement ceremonially gave credit to the Russian peacekeeping forces. They agreed to refrain from the use of force or threat of force, discuss and solve all the problematic issues exclusively on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, in accordance with the UN Charter and the Declaration of Alma-Ata of 1991.

These very same words have been used again and again, to no avail.

The summit did not move the conflict forward toward a resolution because there are underlying principles and the interests of the parties which supersede any good intentions contained in those documents.

If there was any good that came out of this summit for Armenia, it was that Pashinyan stated his position in front of the media, putting President Putin on the defensive. He asked for the full implementation of the November 9 agreement, which calls for the release of all prisoners of war, and asked for the removal of Azerbaijan’s occupation forces from Armenian territory. He also clarified his position on the corridor issue, refusing any compromise of Armenia’s sovereign territory.

This summit proved to be a ploy by President Putin to delay Armenia’s move towards the West. It is not in Russia’s interest to resolve this conflict, because that will move Russian peacekeepers out of the area, which will then reduce Moscow’s leverage on Armenia and Azerbaijan.

For Azerbaijan, hatred toward Armenia is a necessary tool to hold together the regime’s authoritarian rule, one which is increasingly unpopular. Azerbaijani society has been agitating in view of the Aliyev clan’s opulent lifestyle; $700-million property in London and the arms race which impacts on the livelihood of the people. Azerbaijan thus far has been refusing to reveal its losses in the 44-Day War. By some estimates, it is more than double the 4,000 dead of Armenia. And the families of all those shahids (martyrs) have been resenting Aliyev’s self-serving wars.

Incidentally, a videotape emerged recently from an Azerbaijani general killed during the 44-Day War, which expressed fear that the Azerbaijani Army could not win the war without the active participation of Turkey.

Monitors on the border may restrain Azerbaijan for a while, during which time Armenia will have the daunting task of rebuilding its armed forces and developing its multilateral foreign policy.

There is nothing promising in being trapped in Russia’s sphere of influence.