Armenia’s Adventure in Kazakhstan

He was an unapologetic supporter of Azerbaijan and one of the first political leaders to congratulate Azerbaijan after the 44-day war with Armenia. He even had the audacity to come to Yerevan to participate in the CSTO conference, where Armenia took over the rotating presidency, to advocate in favor of Azerbaijan to be admitted as an observer member to that group.

Certainly there was no love lost between Mr. Nazarbayev and Armenia. That is why questions were raised in Armenia with regard to the dispatching of a 100-strong contingent to help Kazakhstan.

There is scant news in the media about Nazarbayev’s fate in this recent turmoil. Some news outlets in Armenia reported that he had sought refuge with his protégé, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev. Other sources indicate that he was sent back to Kazakhstan.

Russia has huge stakes in Kazakhstan; to begin with, it has leased 120,000 square kilometers of land there, including the site of the Russian Baikonur Cosmodrome.

On January 2, the demonstrations began over a 100-percent increase in the price of liquid gas in the city of Zhanaozen and quickly spread all through the country, including the main city of Almaty. Tokayev himself confessed that within hours, 11 regions out of 19 in the country had fallen under the control of rebels, before he gave orders to shoot the demonstrators to kill. The latter had also occupied the airport at the nation’s capital, renamed Nur Sultan in honor of the longtime former leader.

The US denounced the deployment of CSTO troops and claimed that the local forces were capable of restoring order, whereas in some places, law enforcement had joined the demonstrators.

Hundreds of protestors were killed and more than 7,000 detained. The president informed the media that 22,000 armed “bandits” had joined the demonstrators and the insurrection was planned over the last several years.

The official numbers given are that about 3,500 OSCE forces from member countries were sent to quell the unrest. Many believe that the number of the deployed forces was much higher and that they were equipped with more than just defensive armaments.

After President Tokayev’s appeal, it took only two hours to take the decision and to move the troops from the CSTO countries, which include Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. During the entire crisis, President Erdogan placed frantic calls to the leaders of the Turkic nations to discourage the deployment of their forces. Therein lies Kyrgyzstan’s reluctance to participate in this endeavor. Erdogan’s failure to convince fellow leaders was immediately picked up on by domestic political opponents; indeed, opposition leader and former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu blamed the Turkish leadership indicating that Kazakhstan chose to appeal to the CSTO, headed by Armenia, rather than the Turkic Council, headed by Ankara.

However, under the circumstances, Erdogan succeeded in convening a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States (formerly Turkic Council) in Kazakhstan on January 11. The rivalry between Ankara and Moscow throughout Central Asia is having a domino effect.

In Armenia, the parliamentary discussion and decision to send troops lasted one day, while in Kyrgyzstan, the debate lasted longer because there was strong opposition. The abiding question in Armenia is, why did the CSTO remain silent when last May Azerbaijan’s forces crossed into Armenian territory? The same questions were asked in Kyrgyzstan, where the collective defense system did not react when there was a clash between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2010. (Incidentally, Uzbekistan dropped out of the CSTO in 2012.)

The explanation given by the CSTO is that the situation warranted the activation of Article Four of the treaty, indicating that the country was under attack by outside forces. However, those “outside forces” have yet to be identified in Kazakhstan.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has indicated that when Russia enters your house, it takes too long to disinvite it.

At this time, many speculations abound regarding the causes and the outcome of the situation in Kazakhstan Therefore, any analysis with the current information has to be conducted with extreme caution.

One theory holds that this episode was a power play between the Nazarbayev and Tokayev clans and that tensions had long been simmering. One thing is certain: a coup was in the offing and the former prime minister and current chief of security apparatus Karim Massimov, now under arrest, was involved.

Another theory suggests that this was a rivalry between Turkey and Russia, which have come to an accommodation in Syria and the Caucasus. According to this theory, Russia acted to head off a similar compromise in Central Asia.

However, by all accounts, Turkey’s Pan-Turanic plans suffered a setback, with Nazarbayev out of the political stage.

Yet another idea proposed by and promoted by the Tokayev regime and Russian media is that the West was behind the uprising. And indeed, when the US declares its policy of Russian containment and there is a chain of flareups along the Russian borders — Tajikistan, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and now Kazakhstan — there is an undeniable pattern indicating that the US may have played a hand in that picture, particularly with Victoria Nuland of the US State Department visibly orchestrating a Color Revolution in Maidan, Kyiv. Was it coincidental that Kazakhstan’s crisis broke out just a few days before Russian and US delegates were going to meet in Geneva to discuss President Putin’s ultimatum against NATO expansion?

Armenia’s participation in this adventure raises a series of questions across the board:

• Kazakhstan and its leaders have proven time and again to harbor hostile sentiments against Armenia. Is it Armenia’s responsibility to abide by treaty obligations and rush to support the regime in that country?
• When Armenia needs its every last soldier to protect its borders, how could the government afford to send troops to a foreign country?
• How could Nikol Pashinyan rush to quell a popular movement when he himself had come to power through just such a popular movement?
• Armenia participated in Washington’s Democracy Conference on December 10. Would its actions in Kazakhstan tarnish its democratic credentials? And consequently, will the EU’s pledge to help Armenia with massive financial support suffer as a consequence of this action?
• Last but not least, will this action antagonize Kazakhstan’s population against Armenians living there?

The opposing argument is, could Armenia abdicate its responsibility as the president of CSTO? How would Moscow treat that abrogation of responsibility?

Also, if Armenia’s leadership could think far enough, they would realize that hampering Russia’s plans in Kazakhstan would be playing into the hands of the Turks, who would become the alternate beneficiary.

These questions have been raging in Armenia’s political circles and the media and will continue to do so for a while.

In the meantime, President Tokayev has called Prime Minister Pashinyan to thank him for his actions. That is little consolation and even lesser compensation at this time.