Azerbaijani Forces Continue Attacks on Yeraskh

Located at the crossroads of Armenia, Nakhichevan, Iran and Turkey, the hamlet of Yeraskh has gained a new level of strategic importance in the region. The town remains an important stopping point on Armenia’s North-South highway, part of which lies exposed to Azerbaijani fire. Once a hub for regional rail and freight transport, the glory days of the Soviet rails service may seem long gone for the villagers, with its now-abandoned rail yard repurposed as a checkpoint for Russian border guards facing the Turkish border. But if one clause in last November’s Russian-brokered ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Russia gets realized, the town’s role as a rail hub may very well be revived.

That specific clause in the agreement – Article 9, which calls for the reopening of all border and transport links between the two countries – has been interpreted quite differently in Yerevan and Baku. Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly insisted that it gives them a right to a sovereign “Zangezur corridor” connecting the Nakhichevan exclave to the rest of the country along the Iranian border, while Armenia insists that all it does is allow for freight traffic to travel between the two countries, much like US trucking between Alaska and the Lower 48 going through Canada.

Armenia, along with Russia has been keen to see the reconnecting of Soviet-era rail lines which would give Armenian freight more options in the form of routes to Russia as well as Iran. Armenia has repeatedly explored the possibility of building a new rail line to Tehran – and from there, linking to ports on the Persian Gulf – directly through Syunik, but the mountainous terrain has rendered the prospects of such a project prohibitively expensive. Still these new possibilities hinge on an anticipated peace deal between the two countries.

However, analysts suggest that this recent series of incidents form part of an attempt by Baku to keep the pressure on Yerevan in an effort to solve the conflict in Azerbaijan’s favor while Armenia is still recovering from the war. “The logic seems to be ‘two can play at that game’ and aims at establishing parity between Karabakh and Zangezur as contested spaces and a quid pro quo dynamic: if Armenia ‘renounces’ Karabakh, Azerbaijan will ‘renounce’ Zangezur [Syunik],” writes academic and Caucasus specialist Laurence Broers.

According to Broers, Baku’s attempted “coercive bargaining” serves to maximize pressure on Armenia, remind Russia of its obligations, keep Azerbaijan mobilized around the axis of the conflict and keep the focus off discourses of self-determination. Still, so far, Armenia has refused to be intimidated by Azerbaijan’s repeated provocations. On Tuesday, July 27, the Armenian Foreign Ministry released a statement accusing Baku of stalling the peace process through its aggressive actions. “The complete implementation of the process of repatriation of prisoners of war, hostages and other detainees held in Azerbaijan may create a constructive environment for the implementation of the November 9 Statement.”

This latest series of military engagements – the most serious violation of the strenuous ceasefire since the end of the Second Karabakh War last November – coincided with the resignation of Armenia’s interim Defense Minister Vagharshak Harutiunyan. However, this anticipated move appears to have been planned as part of an upcoming cabinet reshuffle as Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s new government is expected to officially take office in early August. The appointment of another general, Pashinyan’s former security adviser, Arshak Karapetyan, to the position of Deputy Defense Minister a week earlier fueled speculation that he may be pegged as Harutiunyan’s replacement.