The Dangers of Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement

“We are ready to assist in that in the most active way,” echoed Foreign Minister Spokesperson Maria Zakharova.

This sudden rush toward negotiations is in the interest of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia, in order to consolidate their political and territorial gains they made as a result of the tripartite declaration of November 9.

Russia has been conveniently overlooking the outstanding problems that have been plaguing Armenia: the return of POWs and the determination of the final status of Karabakh. All this is to forestall the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group co-chairs, meaning France and the US, beginning the process of negotiations under the OSCE, which ultimately will raise the issue of status and question the legality of Russian peacekeeping forces on Azerbaijani soil.

As a delaying tactic, Russia deliberately changed, midstream, its representative to the Minsk Group from veteran Igor Popov to Igor Khovayev, who is taking private trips to Armenia and Azerbaijan to familiarize himself with the situation. Interestingly, during his contacts in both countries, he has not even mentioned the resumption of the Minsk Group negotiations.

In his turn, Mr. Lavrov has reiterated Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s arguments about the release of Armenian POWs, stating that they were captured after the November 9 ceasefire, during a joint press conference with Armenia’s new foreign minster, Ararat Mirzoyan, who, in his inexperience, has failed to remind Mr. Lavrov about Russia’s obligations under the declaration and international humanitarian laws about people held captive against their will.

Armenia has taken the first step by opening up its skies to Turkish flights but it was too early to state that Yerevan is ready for negotiations without preconditions because Azerbaijan and Turkey have made clear they will not come to the negotiation table before their prerequisites are met. Azerbaijan is asking Armenia to sign a peace treaty ceding all claims on Karabakh and Russia has already stated that this is no time to discuss the status issue.

While Turkey comes with a host of loaded historical demands, all along, Ankara was seeking the settlement of the Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan’s favor. Now that that hurdle has been overcome, in Moscow’s view, there should not remain any preconditions. But Ankara has first subscribed to Baku’s position and has added its own precondition for Armenia to refrain from the pursuit of the recognition of the Genocide, drop any claims for compensation and recognize Turkey’s territorial integrity and borders drawn by the Treaty of Kars of 1921.

Therefore Armenia is heading to the negotiation table empty-handed. Yerevan must have its own preconditions which it can counter against Turkish demands. At least it has to place on the table the recognition of the Genocide, if not a package of compensations, to have a bargaining chip and begin the talks from ground zero, ticking off, as they go, claim against claim.

For the last 106 years. Turkey was comfortable because only a sovereign state can pursue legal compensation. Ankara could put up with the nuisance that the diaspora has been raising and could continue to enjoy the fruits of the Genocide with impunity. But as Armenia became a sovereign state, it has become a thorn in the side of Turkey.

Therefore, the ultimate goal must be to eliminate that sovereign state from the map, to be able to digest the spoils of its crime.

Russia’s prodding Armenia has one simple goal: to keep the West away from the Caucasus and finalize its deal with Ankara.

Armenia must not become a pawn in this dangerous game.